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1.  Introduction 
This report  has as its primary  aim  to give  an  idea of  the  development 
of concentration in the  Dutch  food  industry in general  during  the 
period  1964-1971;  the  food  industry is for  the  purpose  of this 
coordinated  Common  Market  investigation,  to be  defined  as  including 
all industrial sectors producing  food  products,  with  the  exception 
of  drinks  and  tobacco. 
Trading activities in  food  products  have  been  systematically 
eliminated,  while  the  geographical area  of manufacturing is restricted 
to  the  Netherlands. 
Agricultural production  -comprising  the  raising of  food  products  on  the 
soil by  farmers,  fruit  and  vegetables growers,  etc.- or  fisheries are 
strictly excluded.  Attention is thus  confined  to  the manufacturing 
and  processing food  industry. 
This is nevertheless  a  large branch  of industry in the  Netherlands. 
As  the  figures  of  table 1  indicate,  the  number  of  firms  with more  than 
10  employees  was  more  than  1500  in  1964,  and  notwithstanding  a  decline, 
there  remained  over  1200  firms  in  1971  with  some  125,000  employees 
and  a  total sales value  of more  than Fls.  20,000 million  (S  5,710 million 
2.  Methods  of Research 
The  research was  carried out  on  the basis of the  data provided  by  the 
General  Industrial Statistics of  the  Central Bureau  of Statistics, 
the  Hague.  All  firms  with more  than  10  employees  have  been  taken  as 
the  base material;  however  the  relevant  calculations for  the 
concentration- and  variation-coefficientswere  made  on  the basis of the 
following criteria for  the  separate variables: 
- for  employees,  the  companies  with more  than  100  employees  were  taken 
into account. -2-
for domestic  sales,  the cut-off point  was  Fls.  10  million. 
for  export  sales,  the cut-off point  was  Fls.  5 million. 
for  investments,  the firms  investing annually in excess of Fls.  2 
million (before  1966)  and Fls.  3 million (between  1966  and  1971) 
were taken into account. 
These  demarcation lines provided groups  of the  largest  firms,  on 
which the quantitative concentration studies were  performed. 
for the calculation of concentration-indices relating to the wage-
bill some  problems  appeared.  There were  differences  in the reporting 
card systems  and it was  not  always  clear whether the wage-bill  referred 
to  firms  or plants. 
Moreover,  the C.B.S.  survey covered only companies with  more  than 500 
employees  and,  most  important,  no  wage-bill figures were available 
for the food  industry as a  whole  (this is one  of the  exceptions pertaining 
to Dutch  sectoral statistics in this field).  As  a  result  of these 
deficiences it turned out  to  be  impossible to  calculate the concentration 
ratios,  Herfindahl-,  Gini- and Entropy-indices for the wage-bill variable, 
and,  consequently,  only Linda-indices are  computed.  Also,  for  companies 
with less than 500  employees  for which the  exact  data were  not  available 
some  wage-bill  figures were  estimated by means  of applying averages 
found  from  known  companies;  this ·procedure does  not  seem to  give rise to 
more  than minor deviations. 
The  companies  included by the criteria mentioned were analysed separately. 
For  each variable,  the fourty or so  largest  companies  were  taken apart  and 
concentration ratios - where possible - were  calculated fov the 4,  8,  12, 
20,  30  and 40  largest  firms.  The  other companies,  falling under the criteria 
mentioned,  were divided into size-classes;  the number  of classes was  chosen 
in accordance with the variable at hand.  The  total number  of companies under 
the criteria is mentioned in the first  column of each table,  following the 
year stated.  The  variation coefficients,  Herfindahl  and Entropy-indices were 
calculated by taking into account  all the firms  in the  food  sector. 
The  procedure followed was  to establish a  linear extrapolation for the 
values of the firms  belonging to the group  outside the criteria enumerated 
above. -3-
For control purposes,  it was  evaluated for the concentration indices 
relating to a  particular variable,  which part of the  sum  of firms 
enumerated by the General Industrial Statistics was  covered by the 
firms  under the criteria;  also,  in respect  of the calculated Linda 
indices,  which part  of the G.r.s.  was  covered by the 40  or 50  largest 
companies.  The  results of these tests are to be  found  in table 2,  3,  4 
and 5,  giving the percentages per annum  and on average for the whole 
period. 
Finally,  a  list of mergers  in the Dutch  food industry covering the years 
1964-1971  has  been prepared (page 8)  and a  short  comment  is added. 
More  detailed remarks will be provided in the sub-sector reports. 
3.  ~he Results 
a.  The  coefficients of dispersion 
For the variable  employees,  both the variation-coefficient and the Gini-
coefficient have  a  tendency to  increase,  reflecting an increasing 
disparity in the size relationships of the largest  companies.  The  number 
of firms  with more  than  100  employees  declined by some  72  units,  or 
about  one-sixth to one-seventh of the original total.  This points to 
increasing absolute concentration,  which  went  hand in hand with an 
increasing relative concentration. 
A similar development  is to  be  seen for the variables domestic  sales 
and  exports,  though the tendencies mentioned were  stronger for exports. 
For both variables,  the two  coefficients rose  13%  or more  throughout 
the years,  with a  marked  jump  during the final years.  Dispersion 
coefficients relating to  investments  show  a  decline for the variation 
coefficient and a  rise for the Gini-coefficient. 
b.  The  concentration ratios provide us  with a  similar picture:  for the 
variable  employees,  the C4  ratio increased by 3.5 percentage points, 
the following ratios (c8,  C12)  adding only  1 percentage point to the 
total rise,  and the group  of the firms  making up the difference between 
C20  and C30  adding 2  percentage points.  Finally,  the bottom class of 
10  firms  did not  raise the concentration ratio.  These tendencies are 
also apparent  in the concentration ratios of domestic  sales and export 
sales,  again on  an increased scale.  Whereas  the top 4  companies  in the 
food  industry increased their concentration ratio for employees -4-
by  3.5 percentage points,  the  increase  for  the  variable  domestic  sales 
was  5  percentage points and  for  the  variable  exports  no  less than  11.5 
percentage  points. 
For  the  next  size  groups  of  firms  (i.e.  the  20  to 40  largest  firms)  the 
rises were  more  modest,  but  nevertheless  for  the latter two  variables 
(domestic  sales and  exports)  double  the  amounts  of  the  variable  employees. 
We  thus retain the  following  conclusions: 
1.  Concentration in the  food  industry increased generally  for  the  40  or 
so  largest  firms. 
2.  The  general  increase in  concentration  was  however  mot  evenly  spread; 
in fact,  the  largest  firms  among  this group  of  the  40  or  so  largest 
firms  pushed  up  the  concentration ratios more  than  proportionately 
for  all these  variables,  but  not  including investments.  As  to  invest-
ments,  concentration did not  change  for  the  share  of  the  four  largest 
companies  and  only to  a  small extent  for  the  eight largest.  The  group 
of the  twelve  and  higher largest investing firms  did  however  increase 
its share  by  some  7  to  11  percentage points  throughout  the years. 
3.  The  rise in  concentration ratios accelerated during the last three 
years under  review  (1969-1971). 
In  1969  there  was  a  decline  as  compared  with previous years,  but  the 
level of  concentration in subsequent  years  was  generally lifted over 
the  level attained in 1967/68. 
The  causes  of  the rise in concentration in general  and its more  than 
propoDtional rise  among  the  top  group  and  during  the  later years appear 
to  be: 
- a  constant  stream of mergers  among  food  companies,  swelling in 1969, 
1970  and  1971.  The  later years  have  seen  some  important  mergers in-
fluencing  the  outcome.  Among  these  were  the  dairy mergers  of  1969-1970, 
constituting  the  cooperative milk producers organisations,  which  have 
been  counted as mergers,  because  they  led to  organisations coordinating 
and  integrating the market  behavior  of  the  producers.  For  a  more 
detailed account  of the  development  of  the  dairy  sector,  see  the 
accompanying report.  Besides,  the  meat  processing activities of  two 
giant  Dutch  firms,  Unilever  and  Akzo  were  United in  1971  under  the 
control of Unile.ver,  while  the  cooperative meat  interests were  united -5-
by  means  of centralisation in the  hands  of  Coveco  (see  the  report  on 
the  meat  canning industry).  A third field where  important mergers  occurred 
was  the poultry slaughtering industry. 
-- Apart  from mergers,  the  largest  food  companies  have  grown  relatively 
fast  by  means  of internal expansion.  The  main  producers  increased their 
exports much  faster  than  their domestic  sales,  confirming a  tendency 
also  found  in other sector studies,  namely  that  the  main  companies  have 
derived  a  large benefit  from  the  opening of  the  European  Common  Market. 
The  export  figures  of  table  10  show  that  whereas  Dutch  food  exportsto 
E.E.C.  countries rose  by  nearly  200%,  exports to other countries in the 
world increased only  by  56%.  The  strongest  growth  of  food  exports  took 
place  to W.-Germany  and  Italy. 
As  to  the  level of  concentration,  this has  remained modest,  notwith-
stahding the  rise, at least  so  far as concentration of  employees  and 
domestic  sales in the  hands  of  the  largest  firms is concerned.  Thus,  the 
largest  4  firms  had  between  15  and  20%  of  employees  and  domestic  sales, 
and  the  largest  20  firms  did not  account  for  more  than  35  to  42%. 
The  level  of export  concentration is however  higher.  The  4 largest  firms 
accounted in the  later years  for  25  to  30%  of exports,  and  the  20 
largest  firms  had  between 55  and  60%. 
Investment  concentTation  showed  divergent  tendencies. 
Both  the  absolute  concentration ratios and  the relative spread  indices 
exhibited variations throughout  the  years,  though  the  concentration ratios 
showed  on  balance  some  increases. 
The  investment  concentration level  was  throughout  the  years higher  than 
concentration in  employment  and  domestic  sales,  though lower  than in 
exports.  This illustrates the  fact  that  the  largest  companies have 
invested (and exported)  relatively more  than the smaller ones. 
c.  The  general picture given  above,  is confirmed  by  the  Herfindahl and 
Entropy-indices.  There  was  a  general rise during  the  period  (with  the 
exception  of  the  investment  variable),  but  the levels attained even  during 
the  later years remained modest.  Thus,  the  Dutch  food  industry, in general 
consisting of very  me~y competing  firms,  shows  a  structure of modest 
concentration,  a  rather pronounced  disparity between  firm  sizes,  a  decline 
in the  number  of  the largest  companies,  and  an  ongoing concentration, 
brought  about  by mergers. -6-
The  top  companies  effected many  smaller take-overs,  plus  some  larger 
regroupings at  the  end  of  the  sixties and  early seventies.  Alongside 
mergers,  domestic  market  growth  and  export  expansion  took place,  the  latter 
developments  obviously  stimulated  by  inflationary movements  in prices. 
Rationalisation of  output  accounted  for  a  stable level of  employment 
(see  table  1). 
do  The  Linda-indices  (tables  11  to  14)  are  in accordance  with the  findings: 
1.  the  averages  for  the  Linda-indices  (Ls)  for all variables are modest 
(between  0.2  and  0.3)  throughout  the  period. 
2.  the  L-index for  the  top  two  firms  is generally higher  than  1,  except  for 
the  year  1970  and  for  exports  during  the  whole  period.  The  curious fact 
however,  is that  there  was  a  persistent  decline  in most  of  the ~  -
indices throughout  the  years 1964-'69/'70;  in the  last  two  years 
the  indices bounced  back slightly,  as  a  result  of  the big mergers 
mentioned before.  Taken  in conjunction  with  the  c4-index,  the  impli-
cation  seems  to be  that  the  two  largest  firms  receded in importance 
vis-a-vis numbers  three  and  four. 
3.  L-indices  for  domestic  sales exhibited declines after  1966  and  1969. 
But  because  of  the  dairy  concentrations,  the  L-maximum  was  reached  by 
3  firms  instead of  two,  showing  that  the  largest  size  discrepancy 
occurred between  this group  of  3  firms  and  the  rest. 
4.  in general  the  level  of L-indices  for  exports is lower  than  for  the 
other variables.  This  indicates a  more  equalized structure  of  the 
exporting  firms  in the  largest  group. 
5.  a  final  noteworthy  point is the  sharp  decline  of  the  L-indices  for 
investments in  1970-1971.  Apparently,  the  top  firms  invested during 
these years less than their usual  shares,  probably because of the big 
mergers.  It may  provide an illustration of the often noted phenomenon 
that  investment  in new  assets and investments in take-overs are to  some 
extent  rivalrous. 
d.  Consideration  of  the  tables for  the  financial indices  (tables 15,  16  and 
17)  adds  a  few  interesting findings  and  conclusions. 
The  L-indices  for  net profits suggest  an  increasing parity between  the 
firms  belonging to  the  group  of  15  leading firms.  This  follows  from  the 
decline in  the  Ls-index between  1965  and  1971,  which  was  fairly pronounced 
and  from  the  decline in the  LN  -index since  196 & On  the  other  hand  the 
h -7-
~h-index declined. 
For the own-means  or owner's  equity variable,the levels of the Ls-indices 
were  low  in comparison with those for the net profits. 
For the LNh's  the  same  applies,  but  for the  ~h's the differences are 
proportionately much  less.  This means  that the differences between  LNh  and 
LN  -indices for the variable own  means  are much  smaller than those for  m 
the variable net  profits,  while,  moreover,  the relative differences  seem 
to be  reduced as the years progress.  From  these tendencies we  draw  the 
following conclusions  (which are supported by a  review of the basic 
material): 
-The profitability per unit  of own  means  for the largest  company  of the 
15  companies  considered is considerably higher than for the rest  of 
the group. 
-Also,  the profitability of the four or five  leading food  firms  is 
relatively higher than that for the rest  of the group. 
Throughout  the years these differences are accentuated and,  moreover, 
the profitability of the group  as a  whole has a  tendency to  remain 
on  the same  level (with here and there some  increases).  This is a 
deviation from  the general industrial trend during the sixties,  which 
showed  a  decline in net profitability. 
The  explanation of these phenomena  can probably be given in terms  of 
the market  dominance  of the  largest  firms,  which are the  leading firms 
in each of their sectors of the food  industry.  In these sectors - which 
for the purposes of this report  are taken together,  but  which  should in 
reality be  considered as  separate markets  - the  leading firms  have  strong 
market  positions because of: 
a.  a  large market  share, 
b.  one or several  strong trademarks,  so  that their products  occupy a 
prominent  position in distribution channels, 
c.  cartel agreements,  or sales associations which  coordinate sales. 
Due  to these facts,  the leading firms  make  better prices and profits for 
their products  than the other ones,  and this raises their profitability. 
If,  finally the findings  for the real and financial  indices are compared, 
it would  seem  to follow that  the largest  food firms  show  a  profit-maxi--8-
mizing behaviour instead of  a  sales-·maximizing behaviour. 
For,  whereas  the  concentration-indic:es for  sales and  employees  of the 
largest  companies  showed  a  decline  between  1964  and  1969/'70,  their 
profitability remained intact. 
In  the  final years  1970  and  1971  they made  good  the relative recession 
of  sales by  means  of mergers  and  take-overs;  they  were  no  doubt  enabled 
to  carry  out  this policy by  their sizes andfinancial means. T
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 Table  10  Processed  food  exports  (see note) 
value  x  1,000,000 u.s.  Dollars 
Belgium  Other 
& 
year  world  E.E.C.  Luxemburg  France  Germany  Italy  Countries 
1964  926.7  500 .. 7  95 .. 6  118 .. 4  220 .. 7  66.o  426 .. 0 
1965  1,042.1  611.1  127.4  114.8  285.4  83.5  431.0 
1966  1,077. 2  631.5  117.5  108.5  304.5  101.0  445.7 
1967  1, 173.8  677.3  122.1  113.1  339.1  103.0  496.5 
1968  1,376. 9  855.0  134.1  175-9  428,7  116.3  521.9 
1969  1,534. 7  998.8  150.2  219.7  510.8  118.1  535.9 
1970  1,881.9  1,272.8  185.0  214.4  694.7  178.7  609.1 
1971  2,127.5  1,451.6  195.0  236.6  803.8  216.2  675-9 
Source  :  Statistics of foreign trade  0  E  C D 
note  1)  trade is included in these  figures Table 11  Food  industry  Linda  coefficients 
Variable  :  Employees 
year  Ls  N*  N1n  ~·  m  N"h  ~*h  N1J.(  ~!( 
1964  0.2192  44  44  0.0754  2  1.622  2  1-622 
1965  0.2213  42  42  0.0781  2  1.258  2  1  .. 258 
1966  0.2171  41  41  0.0854  2  1  .. 138  2  1  .. 138 
1967  0 .. 2206  38  38  0.0963  2  1.026  2  1  .. 026 
1968  0 .. 2171  40  40  0,.0925  2  1.069  2  1,.069 
1969  o.2311  37  37  0.0995  2  1.222  2  1.222 
1970  0,.2203  39  39  0.0947  2  0  .. 935  2  0.953 
1971  0 .. 2772  38  38  0.0952  2  1.891  2  1.891 Table  11 :  Food  industry  Linda coefficients 
Variable  :  domestic  sales 
~ear  Ls  N*  N1n  ~·m  N~  ~~ 
1964  o .. 2330  43  43  0.0745  2  1,565 
1965  0.1956  50  50  0  .. 0629  2  1.505 
1966  0.1948  48  48  0.0674  2  1.525 
1967  0.2010  4o  40  0  .. 0814  2  1.079 
1968  0  .. 1932  42  42  0.0763  2  1,102 
1969  0.2105  40  40  0.0883  2  1.167 
1970  0.1951  44  44  0.0945  3  0  .. 6501 
1971  0.1999  45  45  0.0943  2  0.8412 
N*h(  ~*h< 
2  1.565 
2  1,505 
2  1.525 
2  1  .. 079 
2  1.102 
2  1,167 
3  0.6501 
2  0,8412 Table  13  Food  iadustry Linda  coefficients 
Variable  :  export  sales 
year  Ls  N*  N* m  LN*m  N*h  ~·h  N*h<  ~*h.( 
1964  0.1597  42  42  0.0794  2  0.6083  2  0.6083 
1965  0.1586  45  45  0.0755  2  0.6108  2  0.6108 
1966  0.1601  45  45  0.0?56  2  0.?055  2  0.7055 
1967  0.1378  41  41  0.083?  2  0.6623  2  0.6623 
1968  0.1667  40  40  0  .. 0865  2  0,7918  2  0.7918 
1969  0.1888  41  41  0.0855  2  0.9130  2  0.9130 
1970  0,2002  41  41  0.0101  2  0.6585  2  0.6585 
1971  0.2266  40  40  0.011?  3  0.72?3  3  0.7273 Table 14:  Food  iadustry  Linda  coefficients 
Variable  :  investments 
year  L  N*  N*  ~·  N*  ~·  N*h<  ~*h<  6  m  m  h  h 
1964  0.2102  41  41  0-0766  2  0.7938  2  0.7938 
1965  0,2326  40  40  0.0828  3  1.009  3  1 ,.009 
1966  o  .. 1970  40  4o  0~0725  2  0.8969  2  0.8969 
1967  0.1648  38  38  0.0711  2  0.7618  2  0.7618 
1968  0.1836  37  37  0.0743  2  1.048  2  1  .. 048 
1969  0.2431  36  36  0,.0861  2  1.166  2  1,.166 
1970  0 .. 1459  37  37  0.0723  2  0.5587  2  0  .. 5587 
1971  0.1436  47  47  0.0760  2  0,5638  2  0.5638 T
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 1964 
1965 
1966 
1968 
LIST  OF  MERGERS 
Meneba 
NMU 
Zwanenburg-Organon 
Homburg 
Zwanenburg-Organon 
Homburg 
Scholten 
NMU 
Albert 
K Z 0 
Meneba 
csu 
NMU 
Coveco 
K Z 0 
Meneba 
Duyvis 
Frico 
C M C 
I  T T 
I  T T 
Frico 
NMU 
N C  Z 
Meneba 
Heyn 
Scholten Honig 
Cons.  Foods  Corp. 
De  Sleutels vh.  Koster & Co.  Leiden 
NV  Melkinrichting en flessenmelkfabriek Holland 
NV  Sterovita melkproducten 
NV  Uithoornse Bacon  en  conservenfabriek 
NV  V  erapharm 
NV  van Rooyen 
Gerrit Bussink 
NV  Twentse Vlees  Ex:port  Mi j. 
Ant on  Hunink 
California soepen 
Fino  fabriek 
Noury van der Lande 
NV  van Dijk 
(Lei  den) 
(Amsterdam) 
(Amsterdam) 
(Uithoorn) 
(Meppel) 
(Almelo) 
(Wijhe) 
(Deventer) 
(Deventer) 
(Elburg) 
NV  Kon.  Stoomvleeswarenfabriek B.  Linthorst  en Zn.(Wilp) 
Honig  (Koog  a/d Zaan) 
V  Z  R M I 
G.  de  Meester 
Van  Vollenhoven's Fabr.  Comestibles NV 
V.d.  Meer  & Schoep 
consolidation of six sugar cooperatives 
NV  Dordrechtse Melkinrichting 
NV  Hollandse Vleescombinatie Groot  & Booy 
Kon.  Zout  Ketjen 
Sitos NV 
Zwervers's Ver.  Maatsch.  NV 
Karperton Kaasfabriek 
NMU 
NV  Melkcentrale Amersfoort 
NV  Roomboterfabriek de  Vooruitgang 
Groko  Cons.  en blikfabriek 
Eubisfa 
(Rotterdam) 
(Emmen) 
(Rotterdam) 
(Rotterdam) 
(Dordrecht) 
(Alkmaar) 
(Amsterdam) 
(Rijswijk) 
(Vlaardingen) 
(Alkmaar) 
(Amsterdam) 
(Amersfoort) 
(Woudenberg) 
Trifax NV  (Weesp) 
NV  Veenendaalse Melkinrichting en  zuivelfabriek  (Veenendaal) 
G 0  C Z  (Zutphen) 
NV  Vermaats Bakkerijen  (Haarlem) 
Jacob Duyvis  (Zaandam) 
Coenen Cons.  NV  (Horst) 1970 
1971 
P.  de  Gruyter &  Zn. 
K Z 0 
KZO  and AKU 
together form 
Imp.  Tobacco  Ltd. 
Meneba 
Veconi 
Wessanen's 
s.u. 
Zuid Ned.  Melkinr. 
Cebeco 
S.H.V. 
Nibecom 
Domo  takes over 
Meneba 
British United 
Biscuits Ltd. 
Camp ina 
I.T.T. 
c.M.c. 
Unilever 
Unilever 
s.H.v. 
General  Foods 
Scholten Honig 
Nutricia 
Frico 
Meneba 
Kahiel's Thee  NV 
Duyvis 
A.K.z.o. 
Golden Wonder 
Brood Banket  Beschuitfabriek Dijkers NV 
Ver.  Coop.  Zuivelfabriek Andi 
Jan van Heeswijk 
Coop.  Groenvoederdrogerij 
(Zaandam) 
(Arnhem) 
(Almelo) 
(Doetinchem) 
(Veghel) 
Coop.  Zuivelver.  Zd.  Ned.  Zuivelbond GA  (CZNZ) 
Coop.  Centr.Melkproductenfabriek de Meyerij  GA 
Coop.  Centr.Melkproductenfabriek Bergeijk GA 
Coop.  Zuivelexportver.  "Brabant"  GA 
Kok-Ede  NV 
P.  de  Gruyter &  Zn. 
NV  Ex:port  sl.  De  Haas 
5 factories of Lyempf 
Fano  Friet 
Mayo  NV 
Drents-Groninger Zuivelbond 
NV  Lubro 
V  onk' s  Bakk.  NV 
d'  Blauwe  Molen  NV 
Fritura 
Sibema 
Nobo 
(Ede) 
('sHertogenbosch) 
(Winterswijk) 
(Leeuwarden) 
(Drachten) 
(Smilde) 
(As sen) 
(Utrecht) 
(Leeuwarden) 
(Rotterdam) 
Coop.Melkverwerkingver."Land van Heusden  en Altena" 
Zwanenberg's Fabrieken NV 
Croklaan 
Difa 
Maple  Leaf 
Ave be 
Speyer,  V.d.  Vijver en  Zwanenburg 
c. c. F. 
Amersfoortse Broodfabriek NV 
(Oss) 
(Wormerveer) 
(Dordrecht) 
(Etten Leur) 
(Leeuwarden) 
(Amersfoort) Comments  on the list of mergers  1964-1971 
1.  The  main  sectors where mergers  took place were: 
- the meat  processing industry 
- the dairy industry 
- the flour and bakery sectors and the cooperative  sugar industry 
2.  The  main  companies  involved in merger operations were: 
- Meneba,  (flour and bakeries),  taking over both horizontal competitors 
like De  Sleutels (1964),  and effecting vertical integrations,  leading 
up  to a  dominant  position in bread baking in particular areas (Sitos, 
1968,  Western Holland). 
Scholten-Honig,  a  varied food  concern,  which has  grown  rapidly to a 
prominent  place by means  of take-overs.  In the fall of  1973  the firm 
was  engaged in a  battle with the Cooperative Sugar Union over the control 
of the only private sugar manufacturer in The  Netherlands*.  In 1973 
Scholten-Honig gained control of the flour and bakery interests of the 
Dutch  consumer  cooperative,  which  got  into financial troubles. 
- Many  take-overs  in the meat  sector were  effected by Homburg,  Unilever, 
Nibecom  and A.  Heyn,  the retail chain.  Most  of these mergers were 
horizontal operations,  with  some  diversification intentions.  The  A.  Heyn 
take-over of de  Meester in·1966 was  a  vertical backward integration. 
- Dairy mergers were probably the most  numerous,  and were  effected mainly 
among  cooperatives.  Most  of these mergers  and take-overs were  on  a 
regional basis,  covering several provinces.  The  structure of the dairy 
industry is rather complicated,  with many  mutual  interests and cross-
participations. 
3.  Foreign take-overs were  restricted both in numbers  and  size.  The  main 
foreign companies  involved were  Imperial Tobacco  (Gr.  Britain),  I.T.T.  and 
General Foods  (u.s.A.).  These  companies  penetrated the miscellaneous food 
sectors,  such as canning,  potato chips,  biscuits and chewing gums. 
In the middle of November  1973,  the c.s.u.  made  known  its withdrawal 
from  the take-over battle concerning c.s.M. Part  2:  Concentration in the  fish-canning industriy Report  on  concentration  in  the  Dutch  Fish-canning Industry 
!.General  Survey 
The  Dutch  fish-canning  inrlustry experienced a  ~eneral revival after 
the  second world war,  mainly  because  of  food  scarcities  in  the 
tropical  developing countries.  However,  since  the  earlv sixties 
the  trend was  reversed,  as a resnl  t  of  several  factors. 
The  industry  produced  to  a  lar~e extent cheap  mass  products,  which 
are mainly sold  in Africa.  Producing conntries  like Japan  and  S•Africa 
were  more  and  more  able  to  undercut  the  Dutch  industry,  while at 
the  same1 African  consumers  demanded  a  qualitatively better product. 
So  a  reorientation became  imperative,  which  several  firms  could not 
mana~e to  undertake  and  they  consequently failed. 
On  the  supply side  there  likewise arose difficulties.  The  most 
important  input has  been traditionally herring and mackerel.  In  the 
sixties an  excess  of  fishing activities  took  place  in  the  North  Sea 
and  the  North Atlantic,  so  that  suppli~s hecame  scarcer  and  more 
distant fishing  grounds  ha.fi  to  be  explored.  Since  the  middle 
sixties supplies  of  herring declined  from  over  50,000  tons  p.a.  to 
between  20,000  and  30,000  tons,  whereas  mackerel  supplies  fell  to 
some  10-15,000  tons  (  compared  to  about  25,000  tons  in  the  early 
sixtieR). Prices  therefore  rose  appreciably,  and  though  there was 
some  increase  of  snpplies  of  herring at the  end  of  sixties and 
early seventies,  the  industry  saw  itseJf confronted with  a  profonnd 
reorientation.  This  was  a~gr.avated by  the  rise  in  tinplate prices 
and  the  continuing  increase  in wages  and  social  charges.  The  cost 
increases  and  the  heavy  intfftational  competition necessitated a 
withdrawal  from  the  mass market  and  a  shift towards  quality products. 
As  table  1  indicates,  the  number  of  firms  fell  since  1967  t.o  a  low  of 
17  in  1970.  During  these  years  a  number  of  the most  important  firms, 
in  terms  of  their ranking  in  1964  and  1965,  shifted  to  much  lower 
places  or were  forced  to  terminate  their operations altogether. 
For  example,  ftras  n1~hered two,  three,  four,and  five  in  1~64 (con-
cerning  employees)  had  the  following  positions  in  1971:  eleven,  six, 
three  and  dissapeared.  Firm  number  four,  which  improved  its position 
to  number  three,  nevertheless  experienced a  decline  of about  one-
quarter  in  the  total  of  its personnal.  Only  the  top  fish-canning  firm 
of  1964  continued  to  expand  and  to  occupy  the  first place. -2-
On  the  other hand,  the  renewed  expansion  durin~ the  later years 
I 
(  1970  and  1971  )  led to  an  influx  of  new  companies,  among  wich 
were  several  lar~er ones.  This  expansion  is also apparent  from 
domestic  sales  and  export  sales,  wich  reached  an absolute  low  in 
resp.  1968/1969  and  1968.  The  renewed  growth  since  these  years 
reflects  the  shifts  of  sales  from  the African  market  to  that  of 
the  EoE.r,.-countries.  ftahle  2)o  The  whole  of  the  increase  of  the 
Dutch  fish-canning  exports  between  1965  and  1971  (  $  3.7 million  ) 
was  rlue  to  E.E.C.  sales,  wich  rose $  4o0  million.  Whereas  in  1960, 
70  %  of  canned herrings  were  sold  in African countries  anrl  only 
9  ~ in Europe,  the  shares were  totally reverserl  in  1967:  22  %  in 
Africa and  64 %  in Europe. 
The  structure  of  the  industry has  been  traditionally one  of  small 
firms,  undertakin~ practically no  research  and  selling their products 
via established channels of distribution without  individual efforts in 
sales promotion  and  advertising.  The  Dutch  ~finistry of  A~riculture 
and  Fisheries  has  tried repeatedly  to  stimulate  an  improvement  of 
of  the  branch  structure.  Jn  ]957  funds  were  marle  available  to  improve 
research  in  order  to  enhance  the  quality  of  the  products.  Also, 
it was  tried  to  improve  supplies  by  means  of  premiums  for  adequate 
preparation  on  board  of  ships.  A further  step was  the  financing  of 
a  lar~e melting machine  in  order  to  influence  the  stock  position, 
but this  proved  illusory because  of  the  recedintr catchings.  A tariff 
reduction  from  12  % to  0  or -i  %  was  achieved on  a  quota made  avai lab  1  e 
hy  the  E.E.C.  for  herring  imported  from  Scandinavia  and  destined for 
Dutch  consumption. 
The  large shifts which  have  occurred  in  the  industry are also  apparent 
from  table  3,  which  trives  the  supplies  of  fish  to  the  canning  industry 
in earlier and  later years.  It wll  be  seen  that herring supplies 
got  the  heaviest blow,  whereas  mackerel  could retain its position. 
On  the  other  hand,  conditions  for  the  processing  of  sea  foods,  mainly 
mussels  packed  in glass  jars,have improved.  The  firms  producing  the 
mussels  in  the  province  of  Zeeland  and  some  speciality producers  have 
tried to,promote  brand  knowled~e and  loyalty with some  success. 
(  "  Zeelands  Roem"  for mussels  and  "  Vico  "  for  haddock  liver p'tl, 
are  examples).  The  Zeeland  firms  are  now  threatened by  the  closin~ 
of  the  sea  arms,  so  that long-term prospects  for  the  cultivation of 
mussels  are  less secure. -3-
The  general  tendency by the consuming public to increase its demand 
for  high  qualitv,  imported  fish  products has  led  to  more  salmon  and 
tuna sales,  where  international  brands  such as  Delmonte,  Royal  Mail 
Imperial,  libby's and Princes  are well  established.  There  is also 
a  wide variety of  labels and  retail prices  in  the  sardine  group, 
while  more  expeasive  canned  seafoods  like  crab,  lobster and  shrimps 
(  imported  from  the u.s.A.,  Hongkong  and  China  )  are  also  doing well. 
2.Concentration Tendencies 
Quantitative  studies have  been  performed with  the aid of  the variables 
employees,  domestic  sales  and  exports.  Financial  data were  not suffi-
ciently available  for  this  small-scale  industry which  is  dominated 
by  small  firl'ls  (  the  largest firm  had  in  1971  on]v  212  employees  and 
some  Fls  18  million  sales  ).  In  fact  there  are  only a  handful  of  firms 
with more  than  50  employees.  Discussions have therefore taken place 
onring  the  past  several years whether horizontal  mergers  and  vertical 
integration wonld  not  be  something worthwhile. 
Both  product and  packaging  research  and market research  could  then 
be  improved  and  the  position  of  the  Dutch  firms  could be  strengthe·ned 
in  comparison with  for  example  the  larger W-German  companies.  Stability 
in  raw material  supplies  could be  achieved by  means  of  long-term 
delivery contracts,  so  that prices and  quantities could be  fixed  be-
tween  the  supplying  and  processing sectors. 
But not much  has  come  from  these  proposals.  There  is only one  large 
company  involved  in  the  fish-canning  industry:  S.H.V.,  the  Dutch 
con~lomerate wich  owa  one  of  the  larger companies  in  the  trade;  this 
firm,  wich  also  owns  IJvries  from  Umuirlen,  is  in  t.he  deep-freeze  sector 
of  the  trade.  Unilever of course,  is  one  of  the  most  important 
fish-producing  firms  in Europe.  It owns  the  large  Deutsche Hochsee-
fischerei  at Rremen,  integrated  from  fish  catching to the 270 
special  fish  retailers and  R5  fish  restaurants  in W-Germany.  Its 
prodncinp.::  business  in  the  Netherlands  is much  smaller. 
Concentration  inrlices  in  table  4,  show  a  marked  weakening  of  concen-
tration in the  last two  years,  after  increases  during  the  period up 
to  1970,  at least for  employee& and  domestic  sales.  For  exports  the 
trend  was  more  level,  with  an  exeption as  to  the  last year,  The 
Herfindahl  and Entropy-indices  in particular denote  the  large  in-
fluence  of  the  growing  number  of  companies  during  the  later years. -4-
Th1.s  sudd~n de~l  i.n.e  in concentrati.on  i.R  in line  ,_~ri th  the  preYiouR 
sketch of  thP  dev~lopmAnt in the  in~u~try:  ~A the  ol~  estahli~~P~ 
firm~ faAtly  ~ecli.ned  i'1  importance  (  ~nd  even  were  f"roed  to 
liquidate  )  and  some  relatively large  new  ones  stepped into  t~e 
quickly  expanding deep-freeze sector of the  industry,  con-
centration decreased  both absolutely and  relativelyo  Th,e  last 
tendency  (  which  was  rPther strong  )  is to  be  Aeen  from  the 
Gini- and  Variationcoeff:i.cientso 
With  res!'lf!Ct  to  the  the L-in.dices,  we  not~ an  olie-o-oo1isti.o  p-ro,,p 
of 6_1?  firma,  with  a.!'!  I'l'TJ·  betweAn  0.;>5  a-n.~  o.c:;o  f"or  nomeRtic 
'  h 
Ralqs  and  exports,  and  one"belnw n.?5  for  om~1.o!~ 0 Ro  T~e  i~duRtry 
has  ther~fore  Ataye~  cnm~etitivA,  eve~  thou~h the  major  comnan~es 
(  N'h  )  1.ncreased their dom5.nanoe  with  rPsnect  to  nomestic  sales 
and  ex~orts,  es~eciaJJ.y in 1969,  1Q70  ~nd  1Q?1.  We  also  note  the 
discrenancy between  the  levels of L-indioes of  sal~s and  employees, 
1-.rh:ich  may  concord with  the  ex~lanation given  :i.n  the :precedi. ng 
paragrap'b. 
Investment  data were  too  spotty tn  calculate meaningful ratio's 
ano  indices.  Whatever  indications are  available  s~ern to  shov, 
however,that the large•t  firm  in the  in~1stry invested heavily 
with  time  intervals of  fonr  to  five  years,  ano  that its averaP"e 
5 nvestment  record  was  full~r commensurate  with its first place 
among  other variables.  On  the other hand,  the  investments of  the 
smaller companies  were  dis~roportionately weako  They  seem  to 
have  been  overwhelmed  by the  nroblems  com:i.ng  to  the  f0re  du:r.i.n~ 
the  recession years  of  the  fish-canning industry. Table:  1  The  Fish-canning  Industry" 
1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971 
Number  of  firms  20  23  24  24  20  1~  17  32 
Employees  x  1,000  1.1  1.0  1.1  1.0  0.8  0.9  1.2  1.2 
Domestic  sales  18.P  21.9  25.:1  27.0  21.3  21.4  49.0  59.0 
X  1,000,000  Fls 
Export  se.Jes  22.7  23.7  23.2  25.0  24.7  31.3  36.0  63.0 
X  1,000,000 Fls 
"  Concerning  data  of  firms  with more  than  10  employees 
Source:  C.B.S. T
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 Table:  3 
Sea-fish 
of wlticb  herrintr 
mackerel 
Fresh water  fish 
Mussels 
Supplies  of  fish  to  the  canning  industry 
(  •etric tons) 
1963  1964  1969  1970  1971 
15,224  15,n41  8,787  6,018  7,235 
10,921  10,545  4,001  3,224  3,087 
3,227  4,803  3,260  1,723  3,323 
81  113  142  109  24 
6,991  8,730  13,056  10,686  9,253 
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 T  able;? 
L 
s 
1Q64  Oo6324 
1965  o.4861 
1966  o.4594 
1967  Oo5276 
1968  o.6o4o 
1969  0.7636 
1970  Oo87R3 
19?1  0.4732 
Linda-coefficients  of  the Fish-canning Industry 
v  ariable:  domestic  sales 
N'  N'  r.N,  N'  LN'  N'h(  LN'  m  h 
m  h  h( 
12  6  0.5036  2  Oo7794  2  0.7?94 
12  7  0.3326  2  Oo6538  2  0.6538 
12  9  0.3704  2  Oo6489  2  o.6489 
12  9  o.4501  2  Oo?653  2  0.?653 
12  6  0.4627  2  Oo8553  2.  o.8553 
12  7  0.5713  3  1.0260  3  1.0260 
12  7  0.5436  2  1.3000  ~  1~}000 
12  12  0.2239  2  l.~l?G  2  1o4170 Table  8 
I.J s 
1964  0.2907 
1965  0.2779 
1966  Oo3032 
1967  0.3443 
1968  Oo3485 
1969  Oo3768 
1970  o.448? 
1971  0.4297 
Linda-coefficients  of the Fish-canning Industry 
variable:  employees 
N'  N.L  LN'  N'  LN'  N'h<  LN'  m  h  m  h  h< 
12  12  Oo1942  2  Oo5f;??  2  0.5577 
12  12  0.1894  2  0~5l.i-3~  2  0.5433 
12  12  Oo2179  2  o.6o94  2  o.6o94 
12  12  Oo2510  2  o.62o6  2  o.62o6 
12  12  Oo1968  2  Oo?296  2  0.7296 
12  12  Oo2381  3  0.6121  3  o.6121 
12  12  Oo2567  3  0.7561  3  0.?561 
12  12  0.209?  2  Oo7910  2  0.7910 Table:  9 
L 
s 
'1964  o.4435 
1965  0.3898 
1966  o.4119 
1967  Oo3h04 
1968  Oe3284 
1969  0.3660 
1970  Oo5729 
1971  0.3473 
Linda-coefficients of the Fish-canning Industry 
variable:  export  sales 
N'  N'  LN'  N'  LN'  N'  LN'  m  h  h 
m  h  h 
12  5  Oo3212  2  o.6571  2  o.6571 
12  6  Oo3034  2  0.5625  2  0.5625 
12  8  Oo3198  2  o.68o6  2  o.68o6 
12  12  0.2830  2  0.7424  2  0.7424 
12  10  0.2485  2  0.5375  2  0.5375 
12  9  0.2672  2  o.6383  2  0.6383 
12  7  0.3625  2  1.0510  2  lo0510 
12  12  0.1747  2  0.9083  2  Oo9083 Part  3:  Concentration in the vegetables  and fruit  processing industry Report  on  Concentration in  the Fruit- and  Vegetables Processing Industry. 
1.  General Survey 
At  the  beginning of the  seventies the  Dutch  fruit  and  vegetables 
processing industry consisted of  some  90  firms  with about  110 
establishments,  having  each more  than  10  employees.  Slightly less is 
the  number  of  smaller  firms,  wich  had  a  share  of  only 5 % in total 
output  of the  industry.  As  Table  1  indicates,  these  numbers  have  re-
mained relatively stable;  only the year  1968 /  69  saw  a  decline. 
Production and sales of both processed vegetables and  fruits  have 
increased since  1963 /  64,  but  the general increase masks  varying 
tendencies in the  twe main  sectors and  the methods  of processing 
were  as  follows : 
Table  1 A: 
Ve~etables  Fruit 
1963  1967  1969  1963  1967  1969 
Supplies  322.5 325.3 336.1  supplies  106  104  130 
(million kgs)  (million kgs) 
of wich  (in %) :  of  wich  (in %) 
sterilized  51  50  54  fruit  pulp  15  7  3 
frozen  14  13  17  fruit  juice  16  13  13 
sauerkraut  13  14  12  canned fruit/jars 18  14  13 
dried  13  10  8  apple  sauce  38  45  53 
salted  7  10  6  sirup  4  4  3 
other  2  3  3  frozen  5  10  12 
other  4  7  3 
Expansion  was  greater in fruit  processing than  in vegetable  processing, 
but  both  sectors showed  a  quantitative rise.  For  vegetables,  only the 
sterilization method  and  deep  freezing increased their shares;  in 
fruit  processing all methods  declined in importance,  except  deep-
freezing  and  apple  sauce  production.  The  last sector mentioned is by 
far  the  most  important,  and  exhibits similar tendencies as sterilized 
vegetables,  because it is a  substitute product.  Both types  of products 
are sold in cans and I  or glass  jars.  The  share  of tinplate  and  glass-
jars in total packaging  costs  was  71  % in  1964/ 65,  and again  71  % 
in 1968/69.  But  cans are  losing terrain: in the earlier year,  cans 
accounted  for  60  % of packaging costs,  in the latter year  49  %. 
So  glass  jars doubled their share.  The  consumer  values the  sight  of his 
purchase,  for  quality and  colour  can  be  seen,  and glass packagings T
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demand  care  of the product.  The  same  applies to deep-frozen articles, 
where  colour and  freshness  are preserved and  consumers  have  spent 
relatively more  for  these  types of products.  These  two  methods  of production 
have  their peculiarities : for  canned vegetables coats  of  production, 
stacking and  transport are relatively low;  for  glass packaged articles 
visibility is good,  while  some  articles (leaf green vegetables such as 
spinach)  lend themselves  to deep-freezing methods. 
Processing methods  are  adapted to  consumer  wishes.  Peas and  beans are 
canned,  but  canned  spinach  has nearly disappeared,  and  consumers  pay  the 
higher price  for  the  deep-frozen products wich  account  for  more  than  60 % 
of  frozen  vegetables sales.  Consumers  are  satisfied with the  traditional 
sauerkraut,  so that alternative methods  of preparing  cabbages  have  no 
success. 
Growth  in the  fruit  and  vegetable  processing industry has been  fast, 
but  the  different  sectors have  shown  successively different rates of 
increase.  Between  1950  and  1970  the  output  of sterilized products in-
creased more  than threefold,  but  most  of this growth  took place  during 
the fifties.  Deep-frozen  products have  grown  fast  during  the  sixties 
though  there  was  some  hesitation in the  middle  sixties. Nevertheless, 
the industry as a  whole  grew by  90  % between  1963 I  64  and  1970 I  71 
(table  1 ), of wich  the vegetables sector had  the lion's share. 
Neither are the structural characteristics uniform.  The  canning sector 
is dominated  by  small-scale  firms,  but  the  deep-freeze  sector counts 
only  a  few  large  firms  in Europe.  The  capital intensity is very high: 
the  capital sales ratio is only slightly over  1 • 
The  canning sector has practically no  brand-loyal  customers  (Hero  products 
are an  exception in Holland),  whereas  the  deep-freeze  products are 
heavily advertised,  and  promoted. 
Production costs of  canned  fruits and  vegetables are  about  equal to those 
of  deep-frozen articles at the  gate  of the  factory.  But  the  differences 
afterward are  decisive.  The  stocking in cold  storage  systeas,  the 
transport at low temperatures to  depots and again to retailers,  the 
retailer'sinstallations and  the  broad  range  of products put  a  high 
premium  on  efficient  transport  and  storage,  wich  promotes vertical 
integration. Vertical integration in its turn raises barriers to entry 
and limits the  number  of firms.  If however  the market  expands in future 
years to much  higher  levels of per capita consumption,  (say 10- 20  kg 
in stead of the present 3- 5  kgs)  more  rooa may  be  created for additional 
firms. 
In the  canning sector growth  will be  less but  may  nevertheless be  posi-
tive.  Between  1960  and  the  early seventies per capita consumption rose 
from  5.5 kg  to  10  kg.  There is not  much  advertising and  sales take  place -3-
to food  chains mainly  on  the basis  of  delivery contracts :  the  sale 
is made  and  the  canner  stores the  goods untill he  gets a  call;  the pro-
duction process is not  capital intensive,  and  more  and  more,  the  sale 
is pushed  by  the  large retailers under  their  own  marks.  But  new  products 
continue  to make  their entry also in this sector.  Mushrooms  are  an 
example.  This is now  the  main  export  product.  And  new  marketing techniques 
have  appeared.  The  auctionsare losing out  against  contract raising, 
wich steadies supplies and  prices for  the processors.  On  the  sales side 
the greater  demand  for  convenience  goods also gives  canners more  chances 
to  continue  their growth,  if a  suitable product is supplied. 
Exports  and  imports  have  done  very well in the  fruit  and vegetables 
processing industry  (tab~s 2  and 3).  For  vegetables  the  lines  of 
expansion in exports  and  imports run  nearly parallel.  Fruit processing 
shows  a  declining import  balance  since  1966,  as the  Dutch  processors have 
improved  their market  positions in the  E E C • Table  3  indicates the 
extent :  a  nearly fourfold  increase  in E E C sales between  1965  and  1971. 
In  particular,trade with W.Germany  has intensified. 
2.  Concentration 
Growth  in the  canning industry,  competition  from  deep-frozen  products 
and  from  imports  and  continuing rationalisation have  limited the price-
increases for  canned  fruits and  vegetables.  Table  1  shows  that prices 
have  risen  only  19% during  the  ten year period  1961  - 1971.  This is 
a  general indication :  canned and  deep-frozen  vegetables prices  have  hardly 
risen  since  1964.  Because  fresh vegetables and  foods  in general rose 
in price  during  this period,  consumption  of  canned  and  deep-frozen products 
was  stimulated  (see  graph  1).  Export  prices rose  somewhat  more,  which  may 
partly reflect an increase in quality,  necessary because  of  the  fierce 
competition  with Belgian and  French suppliers for  the largest market  in 
Europe : w.  Germany (90 % of  foreign  sales go  to other E E C countries,  of 
which the Federal  Republic is by  far  the largest  eustoaer). 
Some  firms  did  not  succeed  in keeping abreast  of the  price  and  quality 
competition  or  could  not  sufficiently rationalize their operations.  They 
have  either stopped  producing  (Tieleman & Bros.,Leiden  (1953)  Beverwijkse 
Conservenfabriek(1965),  Hoogenstraten(1969)  and  some  others),  or 
merged  with  other  companies,  often large international firms.  For  a  list 
of mergers  see  Appendix  A.  Companies like Consolidated Foods,  I.T.T., 
Heinz,  Unilever,  A K Z o, and Nutricia are  now  represented in the  Dutch 
canning and  deep-freeze market.  Table  4  gives  the  largest international 
companies in the  trade in recent years • 
Many  of  these  combinations  arose  out  of series of mergers,  which took place T
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 Graph  1  Coaeumerprice-iRdioea 
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1966 
source:  c.B.S. Table  4.  Main  Companies 
Company  &  Processor  in 
Country  of origin  F  & V industry 
1.  Unilever 
the  Netherlands 
2.HERO  Lenzburg 
Switzerland 
3.  Nutricia 
the  Netherlands 
De  Betuwe  Tiel 
L.Aardenburg, 
Hoogeveen 
I  G L 0  Utrecht 
Hero  Conserven 
Breda 
Preservenbedrijf 
Breda 
Main  Products 
jams,sirup,juices, 
fruit  pulp 
deep-freeze  production, 
ready meals,  juices 
sales office  of 
L.  Aardenburg 
canning,dried  soups,juices 
jams,drinks,sauces 
dried products,frozen, 
snacks 
Spijer,van der  canning,juices,concentrates 
Vijver & Zwanenburg  deep-freeze,pickles,jams, 
Employees 
600 
1250 
1100 
350 
Etten-Leur  gherkins  750 
4.  Consolidated Foods  van  ~agenberg- canning, jams, juices, 
gherkins  Corporation  U S A 
5.  ITT Food 
products US A 
6.  A K Z 0 
the Netherlands 
7.  H.J .Heinz  US A 
8.  Ets.Blanchaud 
France 
Festen  Conserven-
febrieken,Heusden 
Groko  deepfreeze,ready meals 
Welco  Conserven 
Ass  en 
H.J.  Heinz 
canning,dried products, 
deep-freeze,sauces 
canning, juices 
Sleutels  Conserven  canning,meals,sauces, 
L.E.Nieuwenhuizen  gherkins,lemonades 
Leiden  (50  %) 
9.  Riscona  Conserven  Riscona,  Warffum 
&  Co.  W.  Germany 
canning 
540 
350 
300 
? 
150 
90 -4-
during the sixties.  A typical picture  of events has  been as  follows : 
Dutch  companies  of national  importance  carried  out  mergers  amongst  them-
selves,  and  the  group  was  afterwards  taken  over  by  some  international 
combine.  Examples are : 
- van  Wagenberg  Festen  Canning  Company  at  Heusden  in Brabant  which  t.QQk 
control  of Coenen  Canning~ the  largest  mushroom  processor in 1969; 
later Consolidated Food  of  Chicago  became  the  100 % owner. 
- Wilco  Canning  of Aasen  was  taken  over by  Duyvis in  1965;  in  1969  the 
group  was  merged  into the  A  K Z 0 consumer  products  division  • 
- De  Betuwe,  Tiel,  the  large Dutch  jam  producer,  Lucas  Aardenburg at 
Hoogeveen  and  I  G L 0, Utrecht  have  been  taken  over  by  Unilever. 
- Spijer and  van  der  Vijver  merged  and later combined  with Zwanenburg, 
wich  had  merged  earlier with Vink.  The  total combination  was  taken  over 
by Nutricia in  1972. 
The  penetration of large,  diversified international  firms  was  therefore 
a  rather general phenomenon,  and,  though  the total number  of  companies 
according to table  1,  seems  not  to have  declined,  the  picture is different 
once  the  various product  markets are  considered  separately.  Table  5 
summarises the main  developments  in product markets 
Table  5  Concentration in the  main  product-markets 
Number  of processing  companies  share  of markets 
Postwar 
1.  Vegetables  canning  3 5  of which 
20  large 
2.  Fruit  canning 
3.  Jams  40 
4.  Deep-freeze  6 
5.  Mushrooms 
Present 
20  of which 
10  large 
15 
4 
20 
held by: 
10  large :  Bo  % 
10/12 large :  90 % 
5  large :  75/80 % 
3  large :  90 % 
mainly small  firms•) 
Source : Estimates  from  Central Bureau  of Horticultural Auctions. 
•)  two  companies  belong  to international groups :  Coenen's  Conserven,  a 
subsidiary of  Consolidated Foods,  and  Nieuwenhuizen,  in  wich  Blanchaud 
of  Chace,  France  has  a  50  % interest. 
Comments  on  Tables  6  to  13 
As  many  products in the  fruit and  vegetables processing industry are 
substitutes  (though processed  by  various methods)  and  separate data  on  the 
product markets  per  company  are  not  available,  the  concentration measures 
have been  calculated  for  the  industry as a  whole.  Throughout,  the  thirty -5-
to fourty largest  companies  have  been  considered  for  the  calculation 
of concentration ratios.  For  the  other  indices,  the  values  of the  smaller 
companies  were  approximated  by means  of linear interpolation.  No 
financial data were  available because  of the  structure  of  the  industry 
and in particular because  of  the  influence  of the  international  firms. 
The  main  findings  are  : 
1.  For  sales  (both  domestic  and  exports)  the level of concentration is 
highest,  but  there is a  tendency to decrease  throughout  the years. 
This is especially  pronounced  for  the  four  largest  companies;  the 
smaller  companies  within  the  group  of fourty largest  do  not  add to 
deconcentration or  only to a  small  extent.  It  follows that  the  structure 
of the  group  of the  largest  firms  has become  more  equalized,  as is 
also apparent  from  the  V and  G indices.  The  mergers  carried out  by 
the  "majors" are not  foreign  to this development. 
2.  For  employees,  the  decline  in concentration  on  the  level of the  largest 
companies is much  less,  and  beyond  the  eight-largest  firms  does  not 
appear at all. This denotes  a  similar equalization  of  the  structural 
composition of the  largest  companies,  and  some  slight  improvement  of 
the  position of  the  group  of 40 largest as a  whole  in  comparison 
with the  other  firms.  Likewise,  the  V and  G indices have  remained 
constant,  whereas  Herfindahl  and Entropy  indices  showed  declining 
concentration to  1968  and  then  rose  again to about  their previous 
levels. 
3.  Comparison  of  the  concentration levels between  domestic  and  export 
sales on  the  one  hand  and  employees  on  the  other may  lead to the 
conclusion that  the larger  firms  are more  mechanized,  so  that their 
output  and  sales per  employee  are higher  than  for  the medium  sized 
companies  and  small  firms.  Likewise,  the greater degree  of vertical 
integration in the  larger  companies might  sustain such  an  idea.  But 
this is certainly not  the  whole  (or  even  the  most  iaportant)reason 
for  the  differences,  as  the  level of investment  concentration of 
the larger  companies is equal to, or lower  than that  of  employee  or 
sales concentration.  Another  explanation of this difference may 
therefore be  more  in accordance  with the  facts : that  the larger 
companies  have  been  ~ess successful in penetrating new  sub-markets, 
where  expansion is high  and  investments per unit  of  output  and sales. 
are  relatively large.  That  is why  their market  shares have  declined 
during the  period.  In  order to counter  the increasing competition 
they have  taken  over  other relatively large  firms.  In this way  their 
investments  (in  wich  the  sums  paid  for  the  companies  taken over 
do  not  figure)  have  remained modest  and  investment  concentration is -6-
lower  than employee  er sales concentration.  Only  in 1970  and  1971  is 
the  discrepancy less  (though it has not  disappeared altogether) 
because  of  the  expansion in the  deep-freeze sector,  where  the large 
companies are strongly represented.  This explanation is also consistent 
with the much  smaller relative concentration of investments than  of 
sales or employees,  as  shown  by the  variation and Gini-coefficients, 
in the years  1963-69.  In  1970 and  1971  the  discrepancies here  were 
likewise reduced. 
4.  The  tables  on  the  Linda-coefficients confirm the  ideas developed above. 
The  L-index measures  the  degree  of oligopolistic equilibrium or 
disequilibrium,  or the  degree  of competition between  the  oligopolistic 
firms in the market.  In tables  10  - 13  the oligopolistic group  of 
competing firms is large  for  domestic  and  export  sales and  employees 
but is lower  for  investments.  For  domestic  sales,  employees and invest-
ments,  the N'm  values have  a  tendency to decrease  throughout  the years, 
though the  LN~ values remain relatively stable  and relatively low. 
They  indi•ate for all variables an  equalizedWigopolistic competition, 
confirming our earlier finding that  coapetition is fierce.  The  mergers 
had  no  influence  on  the intensity of competition in this industry. 
For exports,  N'm  rises in later years to over  30  firms,  and  devi8tes 
from  the total group  considered without  appreciably altering the 
LNm  values. 
The  maximum  values N\  and  ~'h are also instructive.  For  domestic 
sales,  the  dominant  group  of firms  was  enlarged up  to 1970 and  then 
fell back to the  old level of two.  The  ~'h indices for all variables 
are  between  o.5 and  1.16,  denoting an  unequalized oligopolistic structure, 
i.e. a  strong position of the  few  largest  firms  (N'h),  without  however 
impairing the  competitive process.  Moreover  the large fluctuations 
in the  ~·h indices also point  towards  an  intensive  competition. 
It is to be  reaarked that  for  investments the  ~'h is relatively weak, 
confirming our earlier conclusion and sustaining the  idea that  the 
largest  firms are not also proportionately the largest investors. T
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 Table:  10  Vegetables  and Fruit Processin~ Industry 
Linda-coefficients  variable:  domestic  sales 
L  N'  Nt  LN,  N'  LN•  N'h<  LN,  8  m  h 
m  h  h.( 
1964  0.28n8  3~  3~  0.1669  2  0.7678  2  0 0 7678 
1965  0.2750  35  34  0.1441  2  0.7177  2  Oo7177 
1966  Oo2777  33  33  0.14R6  2  0.6855  2  0.6R55 
1967  0.2251  35  35  0.1387  2  0.5248  2  Oo5248 
1968  0.28P2  33  33  0.1656  3  0.6741  3  Oo6741 
1969  0.2727  32  30  0.1491  4  Oo6616  4  0.6616 
1970  0.2453  35  35  0.1540  4  0.6171  4  0.6171 
1971  0.2718  34  28  0.1473  2  1.0420  2  1.0420 Table:  11  Vegetables  and  Fruit Processing  Industry 
Linda-coefficients  variable:  employees 
L  N'  N'  ~· 
N'  ~· 
N'h<  LN'  s  m 
m  h  h  h<. 
1964  0.2886  40  40  0.1297  3  0.9978  3  0.9978 
1965  0.2168  38  38  0.1170  3  0.7074  3  0.7074 
1P66  0.2141  40  40  0.1146  3  0.7046  3  0.7046 
1967  0.2006  40  40  0.11fl4  3  0.5913  3  0.5  913 
1968  0,2298  38  37  0.1243  3  0.7533  3  0.7533 
1969  0.2082  39  39  0.1246  2  0.7218  2  0.7218 
1970  0.2141  35  35  0.1323  3  O.fl176  3  0.6176 
1971  0.2366  37  37  0.1288  2  1.1640  2  1.1640 Table:  12  Vegetables and Fruit Processing Industry 
Linda-coefficients  variable:  investments 
L  N'  N''  ~· 
N'  LN,  N'h<  LN'  8  m  h 
m  h  b.( 
1964  0.3474  14  12  0.2628  2  0.6179  2  0.6179 
1965  0.  3611  14  14  0.3047  2  0.6829  2  0.6829 
1966  0.4262  17  15  0.1538  2  0.5141  2  0.5141 
1967  0.2988  18  16  0.1454  2  0.7053  2  0.7053 
1968  0.2706  19  13  0.1597  2  0.6391  2  0.6391 
1969  0.2644  17  16  0.1627  2  o.687n  2  0.6875 
1970  0.3889  18  12  0.2451  2  0.5P71  2  0.5971 
1971  0.2652  19  9  0.1709  2  o.n435  2  0.5435 Table:  13  Vegetables  and Fruit Processsing Industry 
linda-coefficients  variable:  exports 
L  N'  N'  ~· 
N'  LN'  N'h<  LN,  s  m  m  h  h  hi 
1964  0.3066  25  25  0.2173  2  0.8889  2  0.8889 
1965  0.2844  24  21  0.1860  2  0.6270  2  0.6270 
1966  0.2576  27  26  0.1730  2  0.6294  2  0.6294 
1967  0.3174  29  ?.R  0.2HSO  2  0.9013  2  o. ~013 
1968  0.3416  30  29  0.2165  2  1.0770  2  0.0770 
1969  0.2f\74  36  36  0.1813  3  0.6945  3  0.1945 
1970  0.2165  39  31  0.1579  2  Oo5839  2  0.5839 
1971  0.2607  40  36  0.1804  2  1 0 0260  2  1.0260 Appendix  A.:  List  of mergers  since  1964 
1964  - Spijer Brothers and  van  der  Vijver  merge  into the  Company 
Spijer & van  der  Vijver. 
1965  - Wilco  Conserven is being taken  over  by  Duyvis  of  Zaandam. 
- Luyck's  Producten  N.V.  taken  over  by  Mc.Millan's voedingsmiddelen  N.V. 
{a  Canadian  producer) 
1969  - Groko  taken  over  by  I T T 
- Wagenberg- Festen acquires control  of  Coenen  Conserven  N.V. 
-Luyck 1s  producten  takes  over  N.V.  Kon.  Hart  Zuurkoolfabriek 
{a  sauerkraut  producer) 
- Wi.lco  becomes  part  of A K Z 0 
1970  - Sleutels Conserven  of  Leiden  and the French  firm Ets.  BlanchaUd 
at  Chace  have  agreed  on  a  take  over  of  a  majority participation 
of BlanchaUd in Sleutels  (1970)o  The  firms  have  reap  2500  and  200 
employees,  and  operate reap  10  and  2  plants.  Blanchaud  - with 
subsidiaries in Germany  and  Spain  - produces  vegetables-,  meat-, 
and  fish  canned  foods;  the  company  applies a  new  dry-freezing 
process.  Sleutels Conserven is in the  vegetables and  canning sector. 
1971  - Nutricia acquires  control of Preservenbedrijf N.V.  at Breda  from 
Amstel  Brewery,  Amsterdam 
- Spijer & van  der Vijver merges  with A.  Zwanenburg,  the fruit 
and vegetables canner. 
1972  - Nutricia acquires S V Z  (the  combination Spijer  &  van  der  Vijver and 
Zwanenburg,  formed  in 1971  ~ Part 4:  Concentration in the  meat  processing industry -I-
Report  on  Ccncentration in the  Dutch  Meat  Processing  Industry 
1.  General  Survey 
The  meat  processing industry is a  large sector within the  whole  of the 
Dutch  food  industry.  In  1969, the  turnover of the  food,  drink  and  tobacco 
industry in the  Netherlands was  Fl.  20,870 million, of which  Fl.  5,230  was 
accounted fer by  exports.  The  meat  products sector came  second with a  turn-
over of more  than Fl.  3,000 m.,  compared  to Fl.  4,500 million for the dairy 
industt'Y and  Fl.  900  million for the fruit and  vegetables sector. 
A noteworthy feature  of the meat  processing  industry has  been  the  tradi-
tional reliance on  exports,  which,  since  1969  have  surpassed  domestic  sales 
both in  amount  and  rate of  growth.  Moreover,  exports are much  larger than 
imports.  The  three main  segments of the meat  processing industry are  1eat  pro-
cessing  and  canned  products,  the deep-fr.ozen poultry sector and  the  slaughte-
ries; their relative  importance  in later years is given  in table  2.  The  fro-
zen  poultry market  has expanded  especially fast.  The  canning sector grew 
much  slower.  Sales of meat  in cans  and  glass jar•s rose  from  115  million li-
ters in 1969  to 132  m.  lts.  in 1970,  but  declined  in  succeeding years to 120 
million liters in 1972.  Sales of other meat  precessed remained  stable.  See 
t~ble 3.  The  canning  se~nent is made  up  of minced  meat,  canned  sausages, liver 
pate  and  luncheon meat  (about one-third), and  a  large number  of miscellaneous 
items  such as canned  pork  and  beef,  goulash and  corned beef (two-third, of 
which  the last product  holds  some  5  %). 
The  canned  meat  segment  consists of two  parts: 
- plajn meats  without  added  fats,  such as  ham  products and  tongues 
- canned  meat  delicacies with up  to 50  % fat content and  containing spices 
added,  such as sausages  and  luncheon meat. 
There  are  a  large number  of producers, ranging  from  diversified internatio-
n~l giants like Unilever, or specialised large  producers such as  Homburg,  to 
smaller companies,  or those  belonging to food  chains.  The  meat  bussiness 
is such that  no  clear-cut picture can  be  drawn  of the  various activities of 
the manufacturers, e.q.  those  processing meat, or producing the  canned pro-
duct,  or  th~ delicacies. 
Since  19j4  the  industry grew at a  fast rate, but  in 1969/1970 growth ta-
pered off  01:  the  domestic market.  Investments and  exports continued to in-
crease  to new  heights  however  (table  1).  But  export  prices had  to  be  reduced. 
One  of the  reasons for the relatively slow growth of domest5.c  sales of can-
ned  J"1eat  is the availability of fresh trteat  of good  quality.  Auother is the 
high price cf canned  meat.  Table  4  gives the price developments of canned 
meat  and  slaughte:r.houso  products.  It should  be  read together with table  5 
which  illustrates the  proportion of total meat  supplies which  is processed. -2-
For the main  products, pork  and  beef, the  frac1·ion  is about one-fifth to one-
tenth.  It ft,llows that the processing sector iB  heavily dependent.  fot- its 
input  on  the market  quotations of the  slaughtel·houses, even  though  some  of 
the largest companies  have  integrated vertically backwards  into raw materi-
als production.  The  rising price of slaughtered meat  has driven up  the  input 
quotations for processed meat  and,  together wit.h  increcS.ng  wages  and  several 
charges,  ha~. affected the output prices and prc·fi  tabili  ty of  canned  meat 
products  (mcreover the tinplate cans have  also become  more  expensive).  Pro-
ducer pricef have  risen  49  % between  1962  and  J972,  but export prices have 
gone  up  only 15  % to  1970  and  thereafter fell, so that the rise between  1962 
and  1972  was  only 6  %. 
As  Dutch  canned meat  is being exported  to large foreign markets (table 6), 
the  exporting companies  had  to measure  their price increases.  This  scissor-
like development of fastly increasing costs of inputs and  processing and 
much  more  modest  increases of output prices  (and  in:.particular export prices) 
has  impaired the profitability of several companies.  In particular the  smaller 
companies, and  those which  were  not  integrated vertically (either forward 
into the retail business or backwards  into meat  production)  have  felt the 
pinch.  Also,  some  larger companies  have  not  been  able to escape  the profit 
squeeze  and  the result has  been  a  flattening of growth since 1969,  some 
liquidations and  some  mergers. 
2.  Companies  and  Mergers 
The  main  companies  in the  sector can  be  divided  into groups. 
The  first group  comprises the very large divisions of international  ~om­
panies or large  specialised companie3,  These  ara the meat  processing compa-
nies of Unilever, now  the largest producer  in the  Netherlands;  Coveco,  the 
cooperative  3laughtering and  meat  processing fiT'm,  and  Homburg,  taken  over 
in  1972  by  J,  Lyons  and  Comp.  ltd.  (London).  Th~se companies  each sell about 
Fls.  300 million or more,  of which  the major  pa.r·t  abroad.  Among  these large 
companies also figures the  poultry slaughtery of friki  in recent years. 
After having taken over c.  Rep.  N.V.  in  1968,  a  merger  was  consumated  in 
1971  between  two  main  poultry firms of PJ.uimvee:;lachterij  Wezep  N.V.  and 
Cooperative  P:luimvee  Slachterij  Boxmeer,  to whi :h Goossens  H. V  .' was  added  in 
1972.  The  re:;ult  was  a  combination  with sales of some  fls.  270  million,  com-
pared to the next largest having  sales of about fls.  55  million. 
The  second  group consists of the large domes:i.c  companies  with sales of 
between  Fls.  50 million and  fls.  200  million  in 1971.  Here,  Export  Centrale 
Boxtel,  Stroomberg  N. V.  ,  Gevato,  Groot  and  Booy,  Jansen,  Export  Slaughtery 
Vos,  van  de  Bend  and  Luto  are  the main  companie ;.  For most  of these  compa-
nies, the export market  is relatively less impoptant  than for  the  companies -3-
of the first group, though all of them  sell more  than 1/3 of their output 
abroad and there are  some  noteworthy exceptions of  companies  which  sell more 
than  half of their output  in foreign  countries (Export Centrale  Boxtel,  van 
de  Bend,  Jansen  and  Luto). 
The  third group is made  up  of domestic producers,  selling mainly on  the 
domestic market  (de  Meester, Compaxo,  Beckers,  Stegeman;  De  ~Ieester is inte-
grated with  ~.  Heyn,  the largest retailer in the  Netherlands). 
The  fourth group  comprises  smaller companies,  which  have  some  share  in re-
gional markets  and  may  be  active  exporters  (such as Persoon,  Lisse  and 
Schop,  Rotte"dam),  while  a  fifth group  has  become  important as suppliers 
of special p·':'oducts  such as  snackbar  items  (meat  balls, sausages). 
The  positions of the leading companies  within the  industry have  shifted 
m3.rkedly  bet  .  .,een  1965  and  1971.  For the  group of 19  leading  companies,  we 
ranked  each vf them  in the years 1965,  1967,  1969  and  1971  according to their 
position  in total sales and  calculated rank  correlation coefficients.  These 
gave  the values 0.49,  0.45  and  0.22  for  the  comparative  years 1965-1967, 
1965-1969  and  1965-1971.  Neither were  the positions among  the  leading five 
companies  stable:  companies  number  one  and five  had  disappeared  altogether 
in 1971,  while  two  of the three others also .shifted their rank.  Many  pre-war 
independents  have  been  taken over by  the leading companies  in the periode 
u:;:>  to  19611/65:  among  them  were  F..  Noack's Fijne Vleenwaren- en  Conserven-
fdbriek  (196:+),  Anton  Hunink  (1965),  Uithoornse  Baconfabriek  (1964)  and 
Neco  (all by  Zwanenberg-Organon);  Bakhuis'  Olba Conservenfabrieken,  and 
Exportslacht·~rij lldema  (both by  Unilcver).  In later years merger activity 
continued, a,o, the  taking over of Zendi..jk's Vleeswaren- en Conservenfabriek 
a·.:  Olst  ·y  Homburg  in 1970.  But  this Hag  small fry compared  to the  agreement 
reached  in the  same  year  between  the  tHo  giants Unilever and  Akzo,  whereby 
Unilever ucquired  Zwanenberg-Organon's meat  processing interests.  Following 
the  acquisition of Zwanenberg,  the Unilever group's meat  processing business 
has  been reorganised  so:.that mar'l::eting  and  salen are  controlled  by the Unox 
subsidiary,  ~~hile purchasing and  production  come  to rest with  Zwanenberg.  The 
meat  processing interests of the  new  groups  have  an  employment  of  some  6200 
persons,  and  total-sales of  some  Fls.  600  million, of which  50  % are exports. 
The  reasonsfor the  saJ.e  of Zwanenberg's meat  processing interests were  that 
the  food  sector had  become  of  second<:n'y  importance  ( 8  % of total sales)  in 
the  Akzo  chemical  and  synthetic fib8r  combination,  while moreover,  the  meat 
sector was  nr)t  very profitable.  ( Notvri thstanding the  series of merger·s  men-
tioned  befor11).  The  other main  merger  was  the  take-over of Homburg  by  the 
J.  Lyons  Company  of Great  Britain in  l·brch  1972.  This entailed an  integral 
take-over of this important  Dutch  meat  processoP,  which is one  of the main -4-
exporters,  :.n  particular of canned  hams  to the  U.K.  and  the U.S.A.  In 
August  1972  Homburg  took over the  Beckers firm at  Deurne,  which occupied 
about  the tHentieth place  in the  ranking of conpanies. 
3.  Concentration  indices (tables 7-14) 
It foll01rs  from  the  behaviour of the  concentration ratios (tables 7-10) 
that the  met·gel"'S  of  1970  and  1971  have  had  a  pr'ofound  influence on  concen-
tration in the  top,  while  the mergers of earliE!r years  (1964-1967)  have 
strengthenec1  the position of the  leading companies  as against the rest.  Both 
tendencies  <tre  apparent  from: 
the  increc.:se  in the  concentration ratio of the  four  largest  companies  with 
respect tc•  domestic sales, exports,  employeef;  and  (inversely)  investments. 
This  concE:ntration ratio rose  by  some  4.5  to  6  percentage points from  1970 
to 1971,  l1ut  the  companies  in the classes 4-B,  8-12  and  so on, on  balance 
yielded  a  few  percentage  points.  This denotef;  dectmcentration  among  all 
but  the  four  leading companies.  The  investment-concentrationratio declined'' 
markedly for  the  8  largest (in particular thE!  4  largest companies)  in  the 
later year•s,  indicating the  well-known  phenor.1enon  that  the  largest compa-
nies effected the mergers  not alongside of internal  investments,  but  in 
place of them.  The  same  tendencies are visible from  the  Herfindahl and 
(to a  lesf,er extent) Entropy-indices. 
- The  V and  G-indices mark  a  rise in relative eoncentration especially since 
1967.  Thh.  may  partly reflect the market  strc.1tegy of the majors  to acquire 
control of the  second  echelon of large meat processors and  canners,  so 
that theh· relative position  (Vis a ViS  the I•est of the  trade)  became  more 
important,  for another part, the cyclical recession of  1966-67  may  have 
been  influential in  changing the  indices. 
- The  L-indjces denote  the  same  tendencies,  but less clear, probably because 
the  oligo~olistic competitive range  remained  wide  (see  LNM  values for  do-
mestic  saJcs,  employees  and  exports).  The  group  of dominant  firms  stays 
however relatively stable at  2  (  or exceptionally 3)  firms  for  these varia-
bles  v.•hilE  the  LNH-indices  go  up  markedly  fr(•m  1970 to  1971  (this may  be 
due  to thE  large merger  in  the  trade effected between  Unilever  and  Akzo). 
The  LNH-irdex  is even  above  1  in  1971,  for  dc~mestic sales it approaches  1 
(0.84),  butt curiously enough,  for expoPts  it  declines to 0.52.  Thus  the 
mergers  b.c:ve  not  hampered  the  growth of expot·ts  by  the  smaller fin.1s,  which 
on  the  whc·le  haG  been  fast.  The  behaviour of investment  indices  seems  to  be 
in  accord.: nee  \-ti th our previous  conclusion~  1 here  Here  more  changes  in  the 
number  of dominant  investors, while  the  index went  up  to 1966  and  then de-
clined, eEpccially in  1971. T
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 Table  3  Sales of the Meat  Processin~ Industry 
1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
Cannin&  (  in tinplate  115  129  127  132  130  120 
and glass jars ) 
Million liters 
Other aeat processin!  •  84  83  82  82  84 
million kilo!rams 
Source1  C.B.&. T
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 Table 11  Linda-coefficients of the Meat  and Meat  Processing Industry 
Tariable:  domestic  sales 
L  N*  N*  lw·  N*  LN•  N*h<  ~·h<.  s  m  h  h  m 
1964  0.2766  23  23  0.1402  2  o.8905  2  o.89o5 
1965  0.2235  26  26  0.1392  2  0.5722  2  0.5?22 
1966  0.2108  29  29  0.1236  2  0.6379  2  o.6329 
1967  0.2248  32  32  0.1256  2  0.5588  2  0.5588 
1968  0.2164  33  33  0.1185  2  0.5140  2  0.5140 
1969  0.1993  34  34  0.1127  2  0.5445  2  0.5445 
1970  0.1983  34  34  0.1185  2  Oo5013  2  0.5013 
1971  0.266?  35  35  0.1297  2  o.8426  2  o.8426 Table  12  Linda-coefficients of the  Meat  and  Meat  Processin~ Industry 
variable:  employees 
L  N*  N*  ~·· 
N*  ~·  N*h<  lw·h<  s  II  h 
II  h 
1964  Oo2915  27  27  o.1891  3  o.61o3  3  o.61o3 
1965  Oo3216  30  30  0.1941  3  0.7198  3  0.7198 
1966  0.3115  27  27  Oo2056  3  0.5873  3  0.5873 
1967  Oo3105  34  34  0.1835  2  Oo7003  2  0.?003 
1968  0.3268  30  30  0.2127  2  o.6919  2  o.6919 
1969  0.3209  31  30  Oo2158  2  o.6694  2  o.6694 
1970  Oo2910  33  33  Oo2025  2  Oo6570  2  o.6570 
1971  o.4o3o  31  31  0.2439  2  1.1220  2  1.1220 Table  13  Linda-coefficients of the Meat  and Meat  Processing Industry 
variable:investments 
L  N*  N*  ~· 
N*  ~· 
N*  ~·  s  Jl  h  h 
Jll  h  h 
1964  0.2863  24  23  0.2201  2  0.5588  2  0.5588 
1965  0.3823  20  20  0.2583  3  o.6977  3  o.6977 
1966  o.4798  26  26  0.3351  2  o.8691  3  0.8691 
1967  o.4550  23  4  0.3273  2  o.6o38  2  o.6o38 
1968  o.4246  20  18  0.3087  4  o.6396  4- o.6396 
1969  0.3419  26  26  0.2116  2  0.6391  2  o.6391 
19?0  0.2815  28  28  0.2078  2  Oo6586  2  o.6586 
1971  0.2841  33  22  0.1570  3  0.5932  3  Oo5932 Table  14  Liada-ooefficients of the Meat  and  Meat  Processin~ Industry 
yariab1e:  exports 
L  N*  N*  ~· 
N*  Iw· 
N*  ~·  s  Dl  h  h  m  h  h 
1964  Oo1996  36  36  0.1326  2  0.5207  2  0.5207 
1965  Oo1833  39  39  0.1109  2  o.6295  2  o.6295 
1966  0.1881  38  38  0.1067  2  0.6232  2  o.6232 
1967  Oo2162  4o  40  0.1265  2  Oo5961  2  Oo5961 
1968  Oo2297  40  40  0.1369  2  Oo8110  2  o.811o 
1969  0.2289  4o  40  0.1407  2  Oo7855  2  0.7855 
1970  Oo21?3  4o  40  Oo1377  2  Oo5927  2  0.5927 
1971  Oo2415  4o  40  00 1466  2  Oo5177  2  0.5177 List of Mergers 
1964.  - Zwanenb,!rg-Organon  acquires the control of N.V.  Uithoornse  Bacon- and 
Conserv1mfabriek,  Uithoorn. 
- Homburg  takes over  N. V.  van  Royen' s  slaugh·:eries at Almelo,  G.  Hun ink, 
a  meat  processing firm at Wijhe  and  N.V.  Twente  Vlees  Export  Company. 
- Gevato  1:akes  o\·er  N. V.  Gebr.  van  Zadelhoff and  Engross slaughtery  N. V. 
Drostimt.!X. 
1965.  - Zwanenbnrg-Organon  takes over A.  Hunink  meat  processing company  at 
DeventeP,  with sales of Fls.  45  million. 
- Homburg  takes over the remaining minority  :~nterests in  N. V.  Van  Dijk-
Haarmeyer,  slaughteries at Elburg,  arid  the  N.V.  Stoomslachterij  B.  Lint-
horst  & Sons  at  Wilp. 
1966.  -A.  Heyn,  the  supermarket retaj.ler takes coutrol of J.  Meester, meat  pro-
cessor at  Wijhe;  this effects a  vertical integration. 
- Pluimveuslachterij, a  fastly exiJanding poultry slaughter, Wezep  takes 
over a  :>imilar firm  in Oostzaan:  C.  Rep  N. V. 
1967.  - A merge1•  occurs between  the poultry slaugh·.:eries of G.  Bekebrede  & Zn. 
N.V.  at Barneveld and  Aheco  N.V.  of Wandenherg. 
- Coveco,  the  large cooperative  slaughtery and  meat  processor acquires 
N.V.  Ho~landse Vlees  Combinatie  Groot-Booy of Alkmaar. 
1970.  - Plumrose  A/S  of Denmark  takes over  Gevato  (the meat  processor and 
canner) of Driebergen. 
- Homburg  takes over Zendijk's Vleeswaren- en  Conservenfabrieken at Olst; 
Zendijk is integrated with Verenigde  Slachtbedrijven  Salland at Olst, 
which  also  goes  to Homburg. 
Nibecom  export  slaughteries acquire  the control of Export  Slaughteries 
De  Haas  of Winterswijk. 
Unileve1•  acquires  the  integrated meat  processing interests of Akzo, 
gi·ouped  in the  Zwanenberg-Organon  food  division.  This is the  large-st 
post-Wal'  merger  in  the  Dutch meat  processing industry, and  compriseS 
A.  Huniuk,  Zwanenberg,  Noack  and  UithoornsH  Bacon  Centrale.  Unilever and 
Zwanenberg  operated  jointly since  1966  the  perk:  research centre at  Nieuw-
Holland. 
1971.  - De  Gruyter of  's-Hertogenbosch, a  leading  ~ood retailer, partially owned 
by  Unilever, acquires Difa, of Dordracht,  a  regional producer of deep 
frozen neat.  It will supply supermarkets  in the  Rotterdam  ar.ea.  De  Gruy-
ter has its own  slaughtery in the  Utrecht-]:indhoven area, and  announces 
siTr.ilar plan for the  Amsterdam  area. - Lockwooi  & Food  Ltd.  of London  acquires the majority of shares  in 
N.V.  Lu?ack  meat  processing. 
- A merger occurs between  the poultry slaughteries Poultry Slaughtery Wezep 
and  CoOperative  Poul~ry Slaughtery  Boxmeer,  the  two  largest companies  in 
this  fi~ld: the  new  combination  adopts  th·~  name  Friki  N. V. 
1972.  - J.  Lyon3  and  Comp.  ltd.  (London)  takes a  1)0 % interest in one  of the most 
important producers:  Homburg  N.V.  (Cuyck). 
-Homburg  N.V.  (see above)  acquires  Beckers of Deurne. 
Friki, -<:he  leading firm  in the poultry sla:1ghtery sector  t  acquires the 
second  ~irm:  Poult~y Slaughtery Goossens  N.V.  at Rosmalen. Part  5:  Concentration in the  dairy lindustry CONCENTRATION  IN  THE  DAIRY  INDUSTRY 
1.  Introduction 
The  dairy industry in The  Netherlands  is based on the milk produced by farmers. 
This milk is being processed by the dairy industry into two  main product  groups: 
consumer milk products and industrial milk products.  The  first  group  comprises 
raw milk,  processed milk and milk products  like yoghurt,  custard and chocolate 
milk.  Processed milk is provided in many  forms  (full sweet  milk,  sterilized, 
pasteurized,  sour milk etc.)  and many  packages  (glass,  plastics,  cartons,  etc.). 
The  second group  consists of the "industrial milk products"  such as cheese, 
butter,  milk powder and  condensed milk.  This  group  is by far the most  important 
in terms  of the total milk balance  (see table). 
Table  1:  Milk balance  1972  of dairy plants 
(in 1000  tons) 
OUTPUT 
Processed into  consumption 
milk products  1830 
Processed into  industrial 
products  6713 
Returns to  farmers  as 
feedstock  ~ 
8601 
INPUT 
Domestic milk  supplies 
Derived from  solution 
of powders 
Imports of milk 
32 
..J..Q2 
8601 
In 1971,  the Dutch  share in E.E.C.  milk output  on the  farm  was  11%,  the 
share in deliveries to  dairy plants  14%.  Though  total domestic milk supplies 
to the dairy plants has  steadily risen since  1965  (namely from  6485  thousand 
tons  in 1965  to  8464  thousand tons  in 1972)  the two  main sectors  showed  an 
uneven  development.  Whereas total consumption of consumer milk products 
stagnated,  which meant  a  declining per capita consumption  from  149  liters in 
1960  to  137  liters in 1972  (table 2),  the output  of most  industrial products 
increased (table 3).  Only for cheese,  per capita consumption has  increased 
between  1968  and  1972;  other products (butter,  milk powder,  condensed milk) 
showed  a  decline.  During the preceding years of the fifties and sixties the 
domestic market  for these products still had  grown.  The  main reason for the 
output  growth  in later years was  exports.  The  overall picture in the dairy 
industry (with the  exception of cheese)  thus reflects a  stagnating home  market 
for consumer products,  and a  continuing growth  in the  domestic  sales and 
exports of most  industrial milk products.  This tendency has had an  important 
effect  on concentration in the industry and on the behaviour of individual 
companies.  Another factor exerting a  profound  influence was  the method -2-
Table 2:  SHARES  OF  THE  MAIN  SECTORS  IN  THE  DAIRY  INDUSTRY  (in percentages) 
1969  1970  1971  1972 
standardized milk  18.8  19.0  16. 1  14.3 
sour milk  3.1  3.5  4.2  4.4 
cream  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
special products  0.7  0.7  0.9  0.8 
total consumption milk products  22.9  23.5  21.5  19.8 
cheese  34.6  34.2  36.6  35.6 
condensed milk  15.6  14.9  14. 1  12.8 
milk powder  18.8  19.8  18.9  21.8 
returns  1. 6  1. 3  0.9  0.7 
various  5· 1  6.7  6.2  7.4 
butter  1. 6  1. 5  1. 6  1. 9 
total industrial milk products  77.3  78.4  78.3  80.2 
of packaging milk (table 4):  the  increasing share,  first of glass,  and 
later of plastic and milk cartons,  has  revolutionised the distribution 
of consumer milk products;  the  super markets,  chain stores,  cash and 
carry markets  and lately the mobile retail cars have  raised their share 
of total distributed milk to the detriment  of the time-honoured milkmen 
(table 5).  This  development  meant  the appearance of large scale retailing 
organisations on the demand  side of the market,  which tilted the 
negotiating balance against  the dairy firms.  These dairy companies 
- mainly the cooperative organisations,  which process  85%  of delivered 
supplies,  together with a  few  private family companies  - have  fought  back 
by starting a  process of  re~ional concentration,  in order to build up  their 
market  power. 
Table 3:  OUTPUT  OF  THE  MAIN  INDUSTRIAL  MILK  PRODUCTS  (in 1000  tons) 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
butter  118.9  111.6  121.0  124.7  163. 1 
C;ondensed milk  481.9  494.9  495.3  481.6  475.1 
cheese  245-5  259.7  270.9  297.4  313.2 
milk powder  144.5  138.8  152.9  151.0  195.2 2. 
A. 
-3-
Table 4:  THE  PACKAGING  OF  CONDENSED  MILK  (in percent) 
1960  1965  1970  1971  1972 
Loose  35  21  4  2  1 
Glass  64  77  71  65  60 
Plastic  1  11  11  12 
Cartons  __  1  ___1.1  22  _n_ 
99  100  100  100  100 
Table  5:  THE  HANDLING  OF  MILK  SALES  (in percent) 
1968  1970  1972  1973 
1.  Millcman  85  76  54  46 
2.  Mobile  retail car  0  5  17  17 
3.  Shop  ___..1  ___..1  2  _3 
total milk trade  89  85  73  66 
Retail chains  1  3  7  9 
Comm.  organisations & 
independents  6  7  14  14 
Cash  and carry markets  2  __2 
Total  food trade  7  10  23  28 
others  __..1  __j_  __..1  6 
Total  100  100  100  100 
Structural tendencies 
Number  of firms,  plants,  average  sizes and multiplant  companies. 
A long term view of the dairy industry makes  clear that  the concentration 
tBndencies made  themselves  felt after 1960,  and particularly since 1965. 
The  number  of cooperative firms  declined from  350  in 1955  to about  70  in 
1973.  Also  the number  of dairy plants went  back,  but  to a  much  lesser 
extent  (table 6).  Whereas  the number of companies  was  reduced to  less than 
a  fifth between  1950  and 1973,  the number  of plants was  only about  halved. 
Consequently,  the average  size of firm went  up  much  faster than the average 
size of plant,  indicating that technical factors were  not  the main  reason 
for the concentration process. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the recent  tendency towards the multiplant 
dairy firm,  on which table 7 gives more  information.  Within the span of four 
years,  the number  of one-plant  firms fell from  113  to 36,  and their market--4-
share was  nearly halved.  On  the other hand the  large,  multi-plant  firm 
increased its importance as a  factor in the market  from  slightly over 
half to more  than 75%.  This again underlines other than technical  causes 
for increased concentration,  though of course,  these were  not  completely 
absent. 
Table  6:  STRUCTURAL  DEVELOPMENTS  IN  THE  DUTCH  COOPERATIVE  DAIRY  SECTOR 
( 1950-1973) 
1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1971  1972  1973 
Number  of firms  374  350  331  247  162  101  72  69 
Number  of plants  404  385  357  301  230  236  217  200 
Average  of milk  ) 
receipts per firmk  9.0  9.9  12.8  20.5  58.3  65.3  94.5  107.0 
Average of milk 
receipts per plantk)  8.4  9.0  11.9  16.6  28.2  28.0  31.2  36.9 
k)  in million kilos 
Table  7:  MARKEl'  SHARES  OF  ONE-PLANT  AND  MULTI-PLANT  FIRMS 
(consumption milk  sector) 
end of 1967  end of 1971 
Number  of plants  nr.  of nr.  of  market  nr.  of  nr.  of  market 
per firm  firms  plants  %  firms  plants  % 
113  113  49  36  36  26 
2 - 9  11  32  25  10  31  40 
10  or more  13  26  2  25  34 
total  125  158  100  48  92  100 
B.  Concentration Measures. 
A  long term  comparison also points towards the  increasing dominance  of 
the top  companies.  Table 8  focusses attention on the  share which the 
four- and ten largest  companies had in the total received milk  supplies 
of the cooperative firms.  The  pronounced  jump  between  1965  and  1971  is 
clearly visible.  It was  the period of the regional concentrations in the 
dairy industry,  leading up  to the  formation of C.M.C.  in the Western part 
of the Netherlands,  Domo  and C.C.F.  in the Northern Provinces,  Coberco  in 
the Eastern Provinces  and Campina  in the South.  Together,  these  regional 
cooperatives have  started discussions in 1971/72  with a  view to the 
formation of a  national dairy union;  but  the discussions have  broken -5-
down,  as a  result  of divergent  views  among  the  leaders of the groups 
concerned.  There is nevertheless the feeling that  sooner or later 
- depending on  circumstances  such as personalities,  market  power, 
import  competition etc.  - the talks will ·be  resumed.  The  present  state 
of concentration and its development  since  1967  are given in table 9, 
where  also the state of concentration in the customer's trades -milk 
distribution and food retailing - is presented. 
Table 8:  CONCENTRATION  IN  COOPERATIVE  DAIRIES 
1950  1955  1960  1965 
share of 4-largest  4.3  6.8  7.9  11.8 
share of 10-largest  9.3  13.2  15.2  22.7 
1970 
39.1 
57.9 
1971 
47.0 
67.0 
Table  9:  NUMBERS  OF  COMPANIES  AND  CONC:ENTRATION  INDICES  IN  MILK 
PROCESSING  AND  DISTRIBUTION 
MILK  PROCESSING  DISTRIBUTION  (1971) 
1967  1971  milk trade  food retailing 
Nwnber  of firms  125  48  2300  2120 
Number  of plants/establishments  158  92  9094  15462 
Concentration ratio: 
1-firm  26  59  14 
2-firms  34  80  22 
12-firms  51  74  80  74 
Symmetrical-index  0.90  0.87  0.99  0.99 
Gini-index  0.44  0.57  0.80  0.94 
Herfindahl-index  o.o8  0.10  0.39  o.o6 -6-
Table  10  gives the names  of the largest  cooperative firms,  their plants 
(both for processing consumption milk and industrial products),  their 
location and share of the total Dutch milk supplies in 1972.  The  firms 
marked with an asterix were  involved in the merger discussions of 1971/72, 
concerning the formation of a  national  cooperative dairy union,  but  which 
broke  down.  The  share of such  a  union would have  been 48.3%  of Dutch milk 
supplies. 
As  a  comparison,  the  share of the four private dairy firms together is 
provided,  and it follows that  each of these private firms  is much  smaller 
than  even the  smallest  cooperative combination mentioned in the list of 
the  seven largest.  On  the other hand,  the private sector shows  a  higher 
degree of concentration already for a  long time.  In 1950  the  share of the 
four largest private firms  of the total private sector was  already 42.3%; 
in 1970  this share had risen to  60.9%. 
Table  10:  THE  LARGEST  DUTCH  DAIRY  FIRMS  IN  1972 
Name  Location  Number  of plants  Milk  supplies  Share 
received (1000  tons)  % 
1.  Coberco  il Zutphen  43  2250  26.5 
2.  C.M.C.  il Wassenaar  23  864  10.2 
3.  Domo-Bedum  k  Beilen  20  663  7.8 
4.  Camp ina  k  Bergeyk  11  573  6.8 
5.  De  Takomst  Wolvega  7  350  4.1 
6.  Noord-Holland  il Opmeer  5  320  3.8 
7.  Maasvallei  Roermond  9  302  3.6 
4 Private Firms  212  2.5 
c.  Vertical Integration. 
The  cooperative sector (but  not  the private sector)  of the dairy industry 
has  developed a  remarkable  degree of vertical integration during the past 
twenty years.  The  large regional cooperatives  now  integrate the dairy 
industry from  the  stage of raw milk production (taking place on the  farms, 
united in a  cooperative association)  to the output  and marketing of milk, 
butter,  condensed milk,  milk powder  and other products.  The  central 
production plants have  been the main  factor in this development. -7-
Central production plants (c.p.p.) are plants being operated for the common 
account  of member  cooperative associations.  This means  that  local dairy 
plants are practically always members  of some  regional C.p.p.  The  first 
C.p.p.  dates  back to  1913  and is called Cooperative Condens  Factory 
"Friesland".  Other C.p.p. 's such as Domo  and Coberco  only developed after 
the  second World War.  There have  been no  C.p.p. 's in the Western part  of 
Holland.  In 1937  the c.p.p. 's together processed about  one-third of the 
total milk  supplies to  cooperative milk plants,  which  in itself was  some 
So%  of total Dutch  supplies. 
The  reasons for this emerging forward vertical integration have been: 
1.  Lower  production costs,  because of large-scale processing of milk into 
products like milk powder  and condensated milk. 
2.  These products were  often sold in many  far-off countries in the world, 
so  that  an  extensive sales and marketing apparatus was  needed. 
3.  The  products manufactured in the C.p.p. 's were  "new  products"  in the 
sense that  they were not  produced on the  farms  and consequently not 
processed in the local dairy plants. 
During the fifties and sixties the C.p.p. 's have  clearly been the poles 
of the concentration movement,  directing the horizontal regroupings of 
the cooperative associations and their dairy plants towards  regional 
organizations.  This process is by now  mainly a  thing of the past,  though 
some  further connections between  local cooperatives,  still independent, 
with the regional  groups will be made  in the future.  •rhe  main question 
for the future - say up  to  1980  - will be how  fast  and how  far the regional 
groups will unite horizontally to one or more  national dairy firms. 
D.  Sales Associations. 
These handle the industrial products'  sales of local cooperative organi-
sations or central production  plant~.  These  sales organisations have  a 
long history:  the oldest  one  dates  back to  1893  while most  of them were 
formed  during the twenties.  During the sixties important  mergers took place. 
Four of them united in 1969  to N(nationale)  C(cooperatieve)  Z(zuivelunie), 
while two  main  sales organisations in the South  combined to the Nederlandse 
Melkunie.  The  third main association is established in Frisia: Frico of 
Leeuwarden.  Table  11  gives the share of the sales organisations in the total 
output  of the cooperative sector for  some  important  products. -8-
Table  11:  SHARE  OF  SALES  ORGANISATIONS  IN  TOTAL  COOPERATIVE  SECTOR 
SUPPLIES  (in%) 
1938  1950  1960  1965  1970 
Butter 
Cheese 
Milk powder 
47.8 
33.8 
38.5 
60.4 
50.5 
55.1 
57.2 
56.6 
54.7 
70.4 
59.6 
73.4 
85.3 
70.0 
88.5 
It appears that the  importance of the sales organisations has  regularly 
increased.  But  the regional  concentration of dairy supplies might  also 
undermine their independent  existence,  as they fit  in logically with the 
groupings which have  been  formed. 
E.  Developments  in Distribution. 
The  distribution of milk and dairy products takes place via two  main 
channels:  the milk trade and the  food retail distribution sector. 
Apart  from  these channels there is some  import  and  some  sales take place 
directly to  large-scale users (e.g.  schools),  but  this is quantitatively 
unimportant. 
A complete  description of the distributive sector would  not  do  for this 
study.  We  only want  to  draw  attention to the following facts and tendencies: 
-during the last five  years  (1968-1973)  the  share of the milk trade in 
milk sales has  declined from  89%  to  68%,  while the  share of food 
retailing increased from  7%  to  23%. 
- within the milk trade the mobile car has  grown  rapidly in importance 
from  o%  in 1968  to  17%  in 1972.  Trade  by means  of the mobile car is 
dominated by two  organisations,  namely S.R.V.  and Iveko,  to which  belong 
resp.  51%  and 23%  of the  6,500 milk retailers.  The  consolidated sales of 
S.R.V.  were Fls.  1,250 million in 1972,  which  explains the high degree 
of concentration mentioned in table 9. 
- the number  of parallel products,  besides dairy products,  sold by the 
milk trade  increased from  4%  of total sales in 1958,  to  5o%  in 1972. 
For mobile  cars the  share is probably some  8o%. 
Likewise,  the  food retail stores have  increasingly sold dairy products 
and for both types of organisation the throw-away-package has  become 
more  prominent. 
- this growing overlap  in sales has  increased the intensity of competition. 
In particular,  price competition has  been stimulated.  A survey of price 
competition has  indicated that presently 49%  of milk sold in plastic 
packages  and  68%  of milk  sold in cartons is retailed for cut-prices, 
that  is prices which are at  least  6  cents  lower than the normal  street -9-
selling prices.  In cash and carry markets this share is even  95%. 
The  battle between the  large retailing organisations is thus  seen to 
influence the relationship between distribution and production. 
To  some  extent  concentration between the  companies  in the latter group 
is to  be understood as a  response to  developments  in retailing. 
the  large retailing organisations  (and in particular the  supermarket 
chains)  are increasingly selling dairy products under their own  private 
label.  For  example,  Albert  Heyn  sells milk products under its own  label, 
bought  from  C.M.C.  (the large Western cooperative milk association). 
Largely because of this development  distribution of milk and milk products 
is becoming more  and more  a  nationwide affair.  The  distribution of 
industrial products is more  complex,  but  the main tendencies are not 
basically different. 
3.  Future Tendencies. 
There are  four alternative ways  in which  the organisation of the dairy 
industry in coming  years may  develop: 
A.  The  four main  cooperatives mentioned in table  10  unite their operations 
to  one  large whole,  controlling more  than  5o%  of Dutch milk supplies. 
This  dairy union would have  a  very strong market  position and could 
integrate forward towards the milk trade organisations (esp.  S.R.V.). 
Sales to the  food retail organisations could well  continue under the 
union's  label or under private labels,  but  cut-price competition in the 
distribution of milk would then be prevented. 
B.  Though  the partners of the dairy-union would have a  strong market 
position,  outsiders (the private dairy firms)  could integrate with the 
milk trading organisations S.R.V.  and Iveko,  and  could supply the food 
retailing firms.  In this way,  the  dominant  position of the dairy union 
would  be undermined.  The  condition for this outcome would be that outsiders 
supply a  varied assortiment  of goods  in sufficient quantities on a  national 
scale. 
Given the present-day size-relationships between the cooperative firms  and 
private outsiders this would only be  imaginable if a  strong foreign dairy 
group  would interest itself in the Dutch market.  Such  a  development  is not 
yet  in sight.  One  of the  exceptional  international liaisons of the cooperative 
sector concerns the partnership of Zuid Nederlandse Melkunie with Unigate 
in London,  having 4o%  of British milk  supplies  (3  million tons).  Z.N.M.  will 
deliver Fls.  100  million worth of dairy products which will be marketed by 
Unigate under its "St.-Ivel" brand in the U.K.  (press-report Jan.  1973). 
Nestle of Switzerland is the only important  foreign group  in The  Netherlands, - 10-
having  10o%  control of Hollandia milk products of Amsterdam. 
c.  S.R.V.  and Iveko  could unite to one  firm  and integrate backwards with 
regional dairy firms.  This milk retailing organisation would then be  in a 
strong position and could market  under its own  private label.  S.R.V.  has 
recently proposed such a  step to several dairy firms,  but  these have 
declined to accept.  S.R.V.  now  tries to  effect  regional  liaisons. 
The  proposal was  probably warded off,  because the dairy cooperatives 
considered S.R.V.  not  a  sufficiently well-organised and financially strong 
partner.  Thus  the proposal may  some  day be  advanced  anew. 
D.  A horizontal and diversification merger proposal might  emanate  from  one or 
a  few  large food retail chains to S.R.V.  and to Iveko.  They would then be 
able to offer a  franchise-formula to the mobile car companies  in order to 
establish a  growth market  in the convenience  sector and to  create a  dominant 
position vis-a-vis the dairy firms. 
Alternatives B,  C and D all have the  same  weakness,  namely that they depend 
on the position of S.R.V.  and/or Iveko.  Both organisations are being considered 
by their members  - the private milkman with his mobile car - as purchasing 
organisations and,  moreover,  their staff is not  adapted to the running of a 
united central organisation;  also there are no  assets or sales to be taken 
over centrally. 
For the time being,  S.R.V.  and Iveko are the weak  links in any of the 
combinations  considered,  so  that alternative A - the national combination 
of dairy cooperatives - is the step most  likely to occur in the future. 
This,  notwithstanding the fact  that the merger discussions  between the four 
members  of the so-called Havelte-group have  come  to  a  stand-still for the 
time being. 
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1.  Introduction 
The  Dutch  sugar industry has only two  firms,  viz.  Cooperatieve Suiker 
Unie (s.u.),  a  cooperative  company,  formed  in 1966,  and Centrale Suiker 
Maatschappij  (c.s.M.),  a  company  which resulted from  merger between 
private companies  in 1918. 
The  raw  materials base of the  sugar producing industry are the  sugar 
beets.  Processing of beets takes place in the period from  the  15th of 
September to the middle of December,  called the "campaign".  A number 
of by-products,  such as molasses,  pulp and other sugar wastes are also 
produced and valorised. 
A branch with only two  firms  is heavily concentrated.  This  survey will 
try to answer the questions pertaining to the  causes and effects of this 
concentration,  and the recent mQnopolisation drive  by s.u. 
2.  Initial development  of the Industry 
Although  sugar beets were  produced in The  Netherlands as  early as  1800, 
the real history of the industry goes  back to about  1850.  From  the middle 
of the century to the  end,  there was  a  fast  expansion both in output  and 
in the number  of plants.  Also  from  the very beginning,  there were  conflicts 
of interest between the beetgrowers and their customers,  the  sugarbeet 
processing industry. 
The  latter group,  united in the Association of Sugar Manufacturers,  laid 
down  purchase  conditions unilaterally.  One  of the bones of contention 
was  the compensation of beet  growers according to weights and not  in 
relation to  sugar contents of the beets. 
So  the growers united and  founded their own  cooperative  sugar plants: 
the first  one  arose in Southern Holland at  Sas  van Gent  (1899).  In 1919, 
there were  seven cooperative associations,  covering mainly the Southern, 
and North-eastern beet  growing areas  in The  Netherlands. 
The  largest  factory,  Dinteloord,  processed 108,000 tons  in 1919,  the 
smallest  one 36,720 tons. 
As  a  reaction to this process,  17  private sugar factories merged  in 1919 
under the name  of c.s.M.,  which  closed down  immediately 3  of the plants. 
The  1920-1940  period can best  be  characterized as one of consolidation 
after the  expansion of the previous period.  The  two  main  companies 
rationalized their structure by eliminating less efficient plants: -2-
number of plants 
1212.  .1.2.12 
c.s.M.  17  6 
Cooperative  firms  7  6 
3.  Developments  since  1945 
Between  1947  and  1971  the cultivated area doubled;  the new  areas taken 
into production were mainly located in the 
former Zuiderzee  (closed 
Year  Area  cultivated 
in 10,000  square 
meters 
1947  50.800 
1955  66.800 
1965  90.900 
1970  104.500 
1971  102.300 
1972  113.000 
Index for 
1972  on the 
basis 1947: 
100  220 
in 1931).  Table 
Sugar beets 
processed 
(in mln kilograms) 
1514 
3085 
3733 
4857 
5267 
4934 
325 
new  polders,  being part  of the 
gives the figures: 
Sugar production 
(in mln.  kilograms) 
201 
384 
549 
656 
770 
695 
345 
The  greatly increased productivity is mainly a  result of the modern plants, 
established in the new  polders and to the introduction of a  new  type of 
sugar beet. 
The  Dutch Government's  postwar policy with respect  to sugar consisted of 
- an artificial isolation of the home  market  from  the world market 
in order to protect  sugar beet  growing. 
the fixation of minimum  purchase prices for sugar beets as well as a 
maximum  price for  sugar to  consumers. 
the processing industry got  compensated on the basis of an average 
cost  price for all factories,  plus a  normal  enterpreneurial profit. 
The  least  efficient  firms thus had a  hard time  in making  ends meet, 
while the most  efficient  companies  could earn "cartel rents". 
In the fifties,  the  sugar factories started a  battle for sugar beet 
supplies by means  of higher delivery terms,  binding suppliers and raising 
output;  while the factories would be able to account  for higher raw -3-
materials prices by means  6f better capacity utilisation. 
C.S.M.  introduced contracts  including posterior payments  on the 
preliminary convened purchase price,  if the factory results at the 
end of the campaign warranted this. Also,  certificates covering supply 
period of 5 years  for sugar beets were  issued.  There  ensued a  competitive 
battle for supplies between the privately owned  and the cooperative firms. 
However,  a  cartel organisation developed since 1953,  when  the Stocuso 
(Stichting tot Organisatie Samenwerking uit  hoofde Contingenteringsover-
eenkomst)  was  founded.  Members  were c.s.M.,  Verenigde Cooperatieve Suiker-
fabrieken and Puttershoek,  a  large cooperative firm.  In 1956  and 1962, 
other cooperative firms  adhered or started negotiating adherence and since 
1966,  all sugar producing firms  have  been members  of the  raw  materials 
purchasing cartel.  Two  main points were the subject  of this agreement: 
a)  the purchase price and other contract  conditions 
b)  the  joint transport  and reception of sugar beets. 
Under the last point  of agreement,  sugar factories  got  delivery of sugar 
beets  from  the beet  growers  in their own  region,  notwithstanding possible 
long term contracts with other factories. 
Payments  to  such growers were nevertheless  effected by the factories having 
concluded the  contracts. 
In case of surpassing the fixed quotas,  redistribution took place  in kind. 
Complicated equalisation agreements,  with difficultly to  enforce penalties 
were thus avoided. 
Apart  from  a  reduction of transport  costs,  the main goal of the cartel 
agreement  was  a  freezing of the competitive structure.  Growth  was  henceforth 
only possible in accordance with alotted quotas  based on the supplies of 
sugar beets.  The  Dutch  Government  acquiesced in the cartel,  because it 
deemed  a  battle for sugar beet  supplies with  enhanced beet prices still 
less desirable. 
It feared that  sugar factories would see their processing margins  reduced, 
with consequent  upward pressure on the maximum  sugar price,  which it did 
not  want  because of its anti-inflationary policies,  aiming at  low  food 
prices. 
Difficulties arose when  domestic output  surpassed domestic  sales.  It was 
then convened among  the industrialists that  sugar producers would be  liable 
for surplusses  on the basis of their output.  Moreover,  foreign sales prices 
and sales conditions were agreed. 
So  the cartel still had to  fix the prices of specialized products and 
byproducts.  This was  done  in the Suiker conventie.  Other forms  of cooperation -4-
related to  research,  education,  joint advertising and sales of cattle 
foods. 
In 1964,  the cooperative  sugar factories made  a  joint bid on the  shares 
of C.S.M.  in order to  increase their quotas,  now  that  internal  expansion 
was  no  longer possible.  The  bid was  motivated with the argument  that 
duplication of investments  could be  eliminated if the  industry was  further 
concentrated.  However,  the bid failed,  because of opposition from  c.s.M. 
Then the cooperative sugar factories united themselves  into the Cooperative 
Suiker Unie  (s.u.); this move  was  motivated with the possibility to achieve 
savings  in transport  costs because of rationalisation in beet traffic and in 
deliveries of sugar and by-products to  customers.  After the merger of the 
cooperations,  the s.u.  and c.s.M. 's quotas were  respectively 62,5243%  and 
37,4753%. 
4.  The  Sugar Cartel and the European Economic  Community 
After complicated negotiations an agreement  was  reached concerning the 
policy on  sugar beet  culture and the  sugar industry.  This  agreement  just 
preceded the  consummation of the  cooperative merger in August  1966. 
Before paying attention to the measures agreed on  in July 1966  which were 
to  be  implemented on  1st July 1968  there  follows  some  further  information 
on the  sugar industry in the European countries. 
average  sugar 
production 
Number  of sugar factories  (tons) 
1200-1201  1232-1236  1226-1227  1266-1267  1266-1267 
Germany  295  212  71  62  28,380 
Belgium  107  34  25  22  16,950 
France  334  108  106  78  21,050 
Holland  32  13  12  12  43,960 
Italy  28  ....22.  ..12.  78  15,250 
E. E. C.  total  896  417  293  252 
With the  exception of Italy there was  a  long-term reduction in the number 
of sugar factories.  The  highest  average  sugar production per factory was 
achieved in Holland:  43,960 tons.  The  next  table furnishes  some  data on 
the  degree of concentration of the national sugar production;  it gives the 
shares of the three  largest  companies of each of the  E.E.C~  members  for the 
years  1957  and 1967. -5-
Shares of the 3  largest  sugar producers  in sugar outputk) 
1957 
number  of 
factories  % 
Germany  14  45 
Belgium  8  60 
France  11  18 
Italy  45 
Holland  10  84 
k)  For The  Netherlands  =  2  largest 
Luxemburg  had no  sugar factories 
number of 
factories  % 
17  47 
8  61 
15  25 
45  54 
12  100 
Let  us  return to the  joint strategy that was  followed  from  July 1968 
onwards.  A logical  consequence of the European agricultural policy was 
that the hitherto  existant Dutch policy had to be  discarded. 
The  measures  introduced can be  summarized as  follows:  As  from  July 1968 
t  here was  to  be  established a  directive price of white sugar,  generally 
binding all E.E.C.  countries. 
In order to  effectuate this price a  system of import  duties on  sugar 
beets,  molasses and sugar holding products had to be  introduced.  This 
would  result  in a  protection of E.E.C.  beet  culture and sugar production. 
Secondly,  the Commission was  authorized to  intervene in the market  by 
means  of buying sugar when  as a  result  of a  temporary excessive supply, 
prices were to  drop  below a  fixed level.  The  fixed prices at which the 
Commission was  authorized to  intervene is the  so  called intervention price. 
This market  regulation was  established in order to  ensure that the  consumer 
would have to pay the production costs of the  sugar.  The  factories would 
be obliged to  pay a  minimum  price for beets based on the intervention price, 
whereas the Commission would  lay down  rules  concerning the conditions 
stipulating the contracting of sugar beets. 
The  minimum  price of beets would only hold good if the combined  sugar 
production did not  exceed the  expected consumption  level by  ~. This 
price would be  reduced at  percentages of total production ranging from  105 
to  135  of the amount  necessary for consumption  inside the E.E.C.  countries. 
The  losses on the sales of even greater surplusses would be  completely 
chargeable to the producers and be apportioned among  them. 
Each  of the E.E.C.  countries would be alotted a  certain share  in the 
production of the amount  of sugar corresponding to the E.E.C.  consumption. -6-
If a  deficit  should arise,  E.E.C.  consumption would have to  be  insured 
by subsidizing imports and by means  of extra export  levies. 
Moreover,  special measures were  introduced to make  it possible for the 
E.E.C.  sugar industry to  compete  effectively on the world market. 
The  quotas were alotted per country and the national governments were to 
organize further distributions.  In The  Netherlands s.u.  was  thus alotted 
2/3  and C.S.M.  1/3.  As  from  July 1975  the Commission will establish quotas 
independently based on the amount  of sugar produced in the previous years. 
From  July 1968  onward the Sugar Industry thus had no  longer to  cope with 
national market  regulations,  but  with European ones which were to  lead to 
a  European  sugar market  with no  import  duties or quantitative regulations 
between the E.E.C.  countries. 
However,  the  envisaged European  sugar market  was  slow  in making its 
appearance.  The  reason was  the market  sharing agreement  between the main 
European producers,  involving the making of deliveries in E.E.C.  importing 
countries only with the assent  of the main producers in these countries. 
Imports  in The  Netherlands amounted to  10-13%  of national output. 
They were  dependent  on the approval of the two  producers,  who  violated 
article 851  of the Treaty.  Also,  both  companies abused their dominant 
position on the market  by forcing under threat of squeezing some  leading 
importers to  follow their price strategies.  In January 1973  the  companies 
were  fined amounts  of DFl.  2.9 million (s.u.) and DFl.  2.2  million  (CSM). 
5.  Recent  Events 
Though  the  joint  cooperations did not  succeed in taking over c.s.M.  in 1966, 
their merger  in the  same  year did not  stop their efforts. 
It appears that s.u.  and C.S.M.  have negotiated over a  merger more  than 30 
times  since 1970.  Negotiations which,  according to the s.u.  board of 
managing directors,  were approaching success  in March  1973. 
This  concord did not  prevent  them  from  making a  bid for c.s.M.  shares in 
1973. 
c.s.M.  shareholders were  invited to  exchange their shares for s.u.  bonds. 
1hese j  900  bonds  (at an interest of j  48  per year)  would be  payable after 
3  years,  at  the utmost,  provided the Commission would agree to the merger. 
The  motivation of s.u.  was:  "It is of the greatest  importance for all 
concerned that  the Dutch  sugar industry implements  a  rationalization in 
order to  be able to  continue to  compete within the  extended E.E.C.". -7-
Further:  "we  experience an  ever increasing pressure on the prices of 
sugar from  the other E.E.C.  members;  which results in prices falling 
even below the fixed minimum! 
Concentration is considered necessary in order to  produce at the  lowest 
possible costprice.  c.s.M.  replies that the  consumer never benefits from 
a  monopoly.  Then the  E.E.C.  commission  intervenes. 
It writes in a  letter to the board of c.s.M.  that a  possible  conc.entration 
of the companies  could give them  such a  dominant  position that  it would 
make  all competition virtually impossible.  Next  the Continental Can  Company 
Decision is mentioned which  recognizes that article 86  is applicable to 
mergers  eliminating competition.  CSM  assumes  that  a  merger will be prohibited 
and announces  (beginning of June)  that  negotiations with other companies  in 
the  food-sector are in progress. 
The  company also publishes a  new  stock valuation from  which  it appears that 
the intrinsic value according to the annual  report  is in reality 3  times as 
high.  The  president  of c.s.M.  board remarks:"We  have  been a  static company 
for many  years,  but  now  we  are organisationally ready for all kinds of new 
activities,  alone or in cooperation with others". 
This  deterioration to the status of what  in economic  literature is known  as 
a  lazy oligopolist as a  result of the  combination of the Government  sugar 
policy and cartel-agreements,  had however progressed too  far to prevent 
the company  from  becoming a  play-ball of events. 
Before C.S.M.  published their plans  in the beginning of July,  Koninklijke 
Scholten Honig (K.S.H.)  made  a  bid: partly in cash f  50,-- and for the rest 
in convertible bonds f  900  a 6.5,%.  Later on the bid was  raised. 
The  strategy of this  large food producer was  as  follows:  Starch sugars as 
produced by KSH  and beet  sugar as produced by CSM  are complementary products. 
K.S.H.  uses  grain as  raw  material;  this is getting more  expensive  on the 
world market.  The  desire to  be  less  dependent  on the prices of grain by 
taking over another sugar producer is therefore self evident.  A similar 
tendency,  said K.S.H.,  can be  observed in England. 
Another reason advanced for the merger by managing director Hoefnagels 
of K.S.H.  is the similarity in the research activities of both companies. 
Sugar,  as produced by C.S.M.  has  rather limited possibilities for industrial 
applications,  in a  combination with starch however,  its possibilities are 
more  varied.  As  KSH  already posesses an  extensive research department,  a 
combination would be desirable. -8-
If a  merger will not  be brought  about  (between K.s.H.  and c.s.M.) the 
industrial sugar and molasses  sales might  be  endangered.  In that  case 
K.S.H.  considers taking over a  foreign company as there are no  other 
possibilities in Holland. 
Backward vertical integration,  the raw  material supply,  is an  important 
factor in K.S.H.'s  strategy. 
In the beginning of July c.s.M.  publishes its own  plans,  projecting a 
merger between Gist  Brocades,  Meneba  and C.S.M. 
Again,  the complementary character of c.s.M.  and a  grain processor (Meneba) 
is pointed out,  for sugar and starch are both essential materials in the 
food-sector. 
G.B.  and c.s.M.  are contiguous  in the fields of raw  materials as well as 
ready products  such as alcohol.  The  sugar industry is the supplier of raw 
material to G.B.  not  only in The  Netherlands but  also to Gist  Brocades 
establishments abroad. 
Both c.s.M.  and G.B.  are part of the alcohol  syndicate,  which monopolises 
the Dutch market  for decades.  The  new  company  is seen to operate in the 
future "as an independent  biochemical process-industry,  whose  aim is the 
nourishment  and care for man,  animal and plant". Its orientation will be 
international and it will be  based on  research and directed from  The 
Netherlands. 
Official complaints were made  on behalf of the trade unions  and K.S.H. 
about  the infringement  of the merger  code of Sociaal  Economische  Raad 
(SER).  The  merger regulations of good behaviour have  been broken and the 
SER  commission agrees.  The  partners then abandon the  idea of a  merger; 
if they would hold to it they would have to start again and then proceed 
according to the SER  merger regulations. 
In the meantime  KSH  raised its bid and the s.u.  decided to  do  the same, 
or rather the latter company  announced a  new  bid without  any conditions 
attached.  In November  1973  this plan is withdrawn. 
In January 1974  it became  known  that  K.S.H.  and s.u.  each posessed one 
third of c.s.M.'s shares. All partners to the merger game  have become 
lame  ducks  for the time being. 
6.  Concluding remarks 
The  sugar industry's present  structure has been in existence for a 
considerable time,  in fact  as  from  1920.  Since then no  new  companies  have -9-
been formed.  On  the contrary,  the ones  in existence have  closed down  a 
number of factories. 
The  fact that  no  new  companies or factories were  formed must  be  explained 
from  the existing cartel agreements  and the effects of the Dutch 
government's policy.  For the existing companies  it was  a  period free of 
risks and full of profits,  distributed by cooperative s.u.  but  accumulated 
by CSM. 
After the formation of the E.E.C.  the industry tried to  continue on the 
old lines in a  wider market.  The  Commission's  decision,  against which the 
industry made  in vain an appeal,  broke the cartel agreement.  Confronted 
with the necessity of being compelled to  compete,  the firms  decided to 
merge  as a  way  out,  but  could not  agree  on terms.  Thereafter fattened,  but 
lazy c.s.M.  was  an envied prey to at  least  four major food producers. 
The  struggle for the possession of c.s.M.  can thus  be  explained from  the 
sugar industry's duopolistic structure and its monopolistic behaviour. 
The  present position is a  stalemate.  The  struggle is likely to  be  revived 
in the future. 
Already,  at the s.u.  annual meeting of December  1973,  the reopening of 
negotiations between s.u.  and C.S.M.  was  announced.  A total integration 
of the Dutch  sugar industry continues to be s.u. 's foremost  concern. Suiker 
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50~ Part  7:  Concentration in the flour  and  bakery industries Concentration in the Flour and Bakery Industries 
1.  Introduction:  The  flour milling industry 
The  flour industry has  been caught  between national and international policy 
measures  during the past  fifteen years.  The  E.E.C.  common  agricultural policy 
meant  a  rise in raw  materials prices,  since the frontier levy system was 
introduced in 1962.  Low  world market  prices for wheat  were  raised at the 
frontier to the much  higher C.A.P.  level - which was  reached in June  1967  -, 
while  domestic  wheat  prices adapted themselves naturally to the higher level. 
The  Dutch  Government  has  since the war controlled the miller's margin in order 
to minimalize the bread price increases.  The  industry had to negotiate bread 
price rises with the Ministry of Economic  Affairs  every time an  increase was 
considered necessary and the pivotal point  of these negotiations has  been the 
miller's margin.  During the last  few  years,  moreover,  the world market  of 
wheat  has  been strained with consequent  price increases.  Also,  wages  and 
social  charges have  continuously risen,  foll0wing the trend set  by the general 
economy.  Firms  operating under  such  a  system have,  in principle,  three ways 
in which to  increase their overall profits. 
(1)  They can try to  effect  an  expansion  in total sales,  based upon a  growing 
population  an~or an  increased per capita consumption,  or they can try 
to  export  more  to  foreign markets.  However,  75-So%  of sales of the flour 
milling-industry have traditionally been  sold to the bread bakeries. 
Per capita consumption of bread is declining:  during the sixties,  the 
average rate of decrease was  2%  per annum,  which was  more  than the rise 
in population,  so  that  flour sales to the bakeries on  balance declined. 
The  remaining 20-25%  of output  was  sold to other flour processing sectors, 
such as biscuit making and cake fabrication,  which were moderately 
expansive.  So,  at  best  the market  for flour products  can be  considered 
to  be  stagnating,  a  feature not  likely to  be  changed. 
(2)  Firms  can try to  cut their costs in order to  improve their profit margin. 
But  the structure of costs is such that not  much  can be  done  in this 
respect.  The  industry is primarily a  materials intensive one,  with  raw 
materials,  energy and packaging costs taking up  about  85-9o%  of production 
values,  inclusive of operating profits.  The  margin on which to  rationalize 
is only 1o%,  evenly divided between wages,  salaries and social charges on 
the one  hand and other costs(mainly amortisations)  and profits on the 
other hand.  As  the  firms  (at  least the large ones)  are mechanized very far 
already no  solution could be  found  in this direction.  E.g.  Meneba,  the 
largest  Dutch  flour producer,  owns  modern facilities,  among  which the 
largest  European installation in Rotterdam. -2-
Overcapacities have been systematically eliminated during the past  decades, 
so  that the rate of capacity utilisation of the Dutch  firms  has  been higher 
than  elsewhere  in Europe,  where  serious overcapacity has  been the rule. 
(3)  The  only method for a  firm to  improve its position within the industry,  has 
thus  been merger (outside the flour industry,  vertical integration and diversi-
fication have also  been practised).  Expansion in the flour milling industry, 
being impossible via the internal route,  had to be via the  external way. 
Firms,  mainly the  smaller ones,  but  also  some  of the  larger ones have  been 
taken over,  either because the  share of the market  could be  raised,  or because 
take-over and  subsequent  closure of milis was  a  method to  improve merging 
firms'  rate of capacity utilisation.  In a  receding market,  surplus capacities 
develop  with the larger firms  at  time  intervals:  these gaps are being filled 
by taking over a  smaller flour miller,  retaining his market  share,  but  closing 
his production facilities.  It is probably no  coincidence that various mergers 
and take-overs took place in particular years,  viz.  +he  end of the fifties, 
1965  and 1970. 
2.  Structure of the Industry 
Today there are about  10  large and  small  firms  left in the  industry.  By  the 
middle of the sixties there were  two  large firms,  5 medium  sized ones  and 
11  small mills.  In 1965,  one  of the medium  sized companies,  Noury  and Vander 
Lande  at Deventer was  bought  out  and closed;  in 1970,  another one,  Korenschoof, 
Utrecht,  was  taken over by Wessanen,  the  second  largest  company  in the trade 
and  likewise  dismantled.  The  cooperative consumer's flour milling company at 
Rotterdam was  taken over in 1973  by Koninklijke Scholten Honig N.V.  of Zaandam 
when  the  consumer cooperative organisation failed in that  year. 
Production has,  however,  been continued.  Some  smaller millers were also taken 
over in recent  years  (e.g.  Van  der Venne  at Weert  by Wessanen  in 1973). 
The  leading companies are Meneba  of Rotterdam,  Wessanen of Wormerveer  and 
Scholten-Honig at  Zaandam.  The  development  of concentration is clear from 
table 1,  where market  shares are  estimated. -3-
Table  1:  Market  shares in the flour-milling industry(%) 
Name  of firm 
Meneba,  Rotterdam 
Sleutels,  Leiden 
Wessanen,  Wormerveer 
Noury & V.d.  Lande,  Deventer 
K.S.H.,  Zaandam 
Korenschoof,  Utrecht 
Small  firms,  among  which: 
V.d.  Venne,  Weert 
Walsenmolen,  Sas  van Gent 
Koopmans,  Leeuwarden 
Tarvo  Meel,  Haarlem 
De  Blaauwe Molen,  Rotterdam 
~ 
28 
14 
26 
9 
9 
5 
9 
1.lli 
41 
32 
11 
16 
.1.2ll 
43 
11 
10 
Remarks 
Taken over in 1965  by Meneba 
Closed 1965 
Taken over from  CO-OP 
in 1973 
Taken  over by Wessanen 
in 1970 
Taken over by Wessanen  1973 
Taken over by Meneba  1972 
Taken over by Meneba  in 
1970 
The  causes of this concentration in the  flour-milling industry have partly 
been indicated already.  The  high level of capacity operation of the Dutch 
flour millers (85-9o%  of estimated economic  capacities,  in comparison with 
60-7o%  in some  other EEC  countries)  is mainly due  to the buying out  of smaller 
competitors and the closing of their installations.  In the early stages of the 
modern  flour-milling industry- the period up  to  1930  - technical  factors also 
played a  role,  as many  smaller firms  could not  muster sufficient  finance to 
mechanize their mills.  The  most  important  technological  advance  dates  back to 
182 5 when  the Austrian engineer Hart guss  invented the "mill chair". 
This  replaced the mill-stones,  which  had to  be  sharpened frequently,  implying 
losses of labour time.  Only after 1870  the technique was  applied on  a  larger 
scale and many  new  mills were  started.  One  of the oldest  Dutch  flour mills, 
De  Sleutels at  Leyden  (taken over in 1965),  had in 1884  a  daily milling 
capacity of 24  tons.  In 1922  another firm was  taken over and the capacity of 
the two  mills owned  by De  Sleutels  was  200  tons per day.  This was  raised to 
350  tons  in 1930.  Six years later one  of the mills was  closed and production 
was  concentrated in Leyden.  In 1964,  the capacity had gone  up  to  600  tons per 
day.  Present-day installations are capable of milling similar or higher amounts. 
Another indication is provided by silo-capacities,  which  in the  early seventies 
ranged  from  70.000  tons  storage capacity for the largest  firm to  some  30.000  tons 
for the next  two  largest.  Also,  the production process has  been refined,  with -4-
a  complicated  system of ladders,  screws,  pipes etc.  being operated for the 
control of humidity in silos,  purification,  conditioning and mixing apparatus 
for the preparation of the  raw materials,  the milling in several  stages  in 
order to  get  increasingly finer products and the control,  storage,  packaging, 
transport  and distribution of the final  output.  Thus  the production process is 
apart  from  being primarily materials-intensive - a  capital-intensive one. 
The  typical cost-price calculation for flour production (based on  information 
from  one of the  larger millers)  in the early seventies would be: 
Sales per ton  Fls  500,--
Purchase price wheat 
plus freight 
Gross miller's charge 
Fls  430,--
Fls  70,-- per ton 
With production costs to  an amount  of some  Fls 40,-- per ton and distribution, 
packaging and auxiliarity materials  costs of Fls 10,--,  this would  leave a 
net-miller's margin of some  Fls 20,-- per ton.  Production costs could be  split 
into: 
Fls 14,-- for wages  and social charges 
Fls 17,50  for capital and maintenance  costs 
Fls  8,50  for variable costs,  such as  energy,  and various costs 
~~~=~~~~ 
Of  course,  the production costs,  sales values and miller's margins fluctuate 
heavily,  depending on purchase prices for wheat  and the degree of capacity 
operation.  The  first  factor can be  influenced by a  shrewd purchase policy, 
but  is mainly a  datum  for the company.  The  second factor can however be 
influenced by the buying of market  shares in flour milling,  the forward 
integration into  bread baking so  that  sales can be  steadied and by raising 
the value of by-products,  which means  diversification.  A review of the 
structure of the main  firms  brings out  the extent  to which these tendencies 
have  been operative. 
3.  The  main Companies 
The  three largest  flour millers are Meneba  of Rotterdam,  Wessanen of Wormerveer 
and KSH  of Zaandam. 
(1)  Meneba  is an integrated flour miller and bread baking company.  Of  the 
1  million tons of wheat  per annum,  milled by the Dutch  companies throughout 
the sixties,  Meneba  had a  share of some  4o%;  its share of home  market  sales 
decreased slightly towards the  end of the sixties,  but  exports rose fast -5-
since 1964/65,  though the level is not  yet  large  (some Fls 30  million in 
recent  years).  The  main  figures  for the group  as  a  whole  are  summarized  in 
table 2. 
1968  122.2.  1970 
Employeesk)  4744  4648  4533 
In million guilders: 
Sales  (excl.  of TVA)  316  330  373 
Gross  income kk)  14.8  16. 1  18.6 
Depreciat  ionkkik)  11.3  11.6  13.5 
Net  profits  3.5  4.5  5· 1 
Own  means  88.4  97.3  103.0 
k)  Exclusive of part-time employees 
kk)  on  a  crude basis this equals  cash-flow. 
kkk)  replacement  values 
.121.1.  .1.2:R 
4586  4619 
411  439 
19.2  24.5 
14.5  17.2 
4.7  7.3 
113.6  119.8 
Source:  Annual  reports 
The  structure of the Meneba-group,  which is a  holding with  some  46  operating 
companies  is as  follows: 
Division  Number  of com12anies  EmElO;lees 
Flour milling  8  560 
Bread  19  40ook) 
Animal  products  8  970 
Third divisionk.t)  3  235 
Ecology  3  100 
Recreation  3  90 
k)  inclusive of 1000  part-timers,  such as  shop  personnel,  packaging etc. 
kk)  chocolates,  biscuits and  insurance & brokerage 
Source:  Fin.  Dagblad,  Febr.  14,  1974. 
Total  sales in 1974  are  estimated at Fls 900  million,  probably inclusive 
of taxes.  A large addition to the animal products division was  effected in 
1973  when  one of the prominent  Dutch cattle food and other animal  food 
producers,  Koudys  was  taken over.  Previously Meneba  had already 43.5%  of the 
share capital of Koudys.  It will be  seen that  the  company  is expanding by 
both vertical integration and diversification.  Sales of the flour-milling 
division take place to the bread bakeries and to  industrial manufacturers. 
Sales to the last  group have  risen strongly,  during the past  few  years;  sales -6-
to the bakery sector are split between third parties and owned  bread 
bakeries.  The  latter group accounts  for about  4~ of total flour sales 
to bakeries.  Vertical integration is pursued for two  main motives: 
(1)  stability of flour sales and an acceptable capacity utilization, 
(2)  direct  contacts with final bread consumers,  which  gives the flour 
milling section clues to the tendencies in demand.  It has to  be noted 
that  the varieties of flour produced increase fast  in response to 
diverging consumer wishes and regional take-over of bakeries by Meneba 
has therefore been a  phenomenon of recent  years. 
(2)  Wessanen;  Though  second to Meneba  in the flour and bread baking sectors 
of the food  industry,  Wessanen is about  as  large in total sales,  because 
the  company  has a  broader spread over other food  industry products. 
It produces  in six main  sectors namely (1)  cocoa-vegetable oils,  (2)  veal 
feedstuffs,  vitamines and specialities,  (3)  other animal  feedstuff, 
(4)  flour and bread baking,  (5)  other wheat  products,  such as  cornflakes, 
and (6)  chocolatery,  rice and various other articles.  No  division of sales 
or employees over these various  sectors is published.  The  total number of 
operating companies  in 1972  was  44,  of which  13  companies  were  established 
abroad (of which 8 in EEC  countries).  Foreign activities comprise about  4o% 
of the total.  Consolidated figures  for Wessanen have  been: 
Wessanen:  1268  - 1213=  Overall  indicators 
~  .12§2  1270  .12ll  .1.2.R  12ll 
lllilployees  2150  2080  2115  2027  2306  2989 
in million guilders: 
sales  509  539  585  649  729  1087 
cash  flow  16.5  16.6  17 .o  18.5  23.5  28.9 
depreciation*)  8.7  8.4  8.9  9.6  12.1  13.8 
Net  profits  7.8  8.2  8.1  8.9  11.4  15. 1 
Own  Means  105.3  111.3  117.6  127.4  139.3  155.7 
Investments  12.6  7.9  18.5  9.8  20.4  85.6 
k)  based on  replacement  values 
Source:  Annual  reports -7-
Sales for  1975  are  estimated over Fls  1000  million,  double the  1968  figure. 
In 1973  two  major acquisitions were  effected:  the meat  producer Nibecom/NVC 
with  sales of approximately Fls 300  million in 1972  in which  a  7o%  interest 
was  acquired and the milk producing firm of Lyempf,  of Leeuwarden  (sales 
nearly Fls 90  million in 1972).  The  policy of the firm was  explained at  the 
end of 1973  by the  company's president as  follows:'~oo large a  share of 
sector markets makes  a  firm vulnerable,  but  diversification is pursued within 
the context  of coherence with activities in other sectors.  Diversification will 
be carried out  both via internal and via external  expansion.  The  company  aims 
at  a  rate of return (after taxation)  of 10-12%  on the means  invested". 
This latter desideratum has  not  yet  been achieved.  The  table below  indicates 
that  growth of sales has fluctuated around  1o%  and net  profit  (measured on 
the basis of replacement  value)between 7  and  8%  (on equity)  and 1.4- 1.7% 
(on sales). 
Wessanen  1964  - 1972 
1964  .1.2.§2  ~  12B  1968  .12§.2.  1970  .121.1.  .1.2E. 
sales (million)  332  379  409  458  509  539  585  649  729 
% growth  17 .o  13.7  8.3  11.8  11.2  6.2  8.4  11.2  12.2 
Net  profits (million)  5.0  5.7  6.3  6.7  7.8  8.2  8.1  8.9  11.4 
As  a% of sales  1. 51  1. 50  1. 54  1.46  1. 53  1. 52  1.38  1.37  1. 56 
As  a% of equity  7.1  7. 5  7.8  7.7  7.4  7.4  6.9  7.0  8.2 
The  cocoa,  calf breeding and flour milling sectors have  contributed to profits. 
Sales are expected to  grow  faster in future  years,  not  only because  of the 
take-overs,  but  also  because capacities are being enlarged: 
•  a  one-third expansion of capacity in the cocoa-sector 
•  a  new  calf breeding milk factory and a  mixed-food factory,  both at Meppel 
•  expansion of pig breeding 
•  a  doubling of chocolate sprinkle spread capacity at Tilburg. 
Wessanen  has a  strong financial position,  reflected by the favourable 
liquidity position and the ratio between equity and total debts.  (5o%  of 
equity). 
(3)  The  third major flour-miller is Koninklijke Scholten-Honig N.V.  (K.S.H.) 
at  Zaandam.  This  group  arose out  of a  merger between the two  firms  of Scholten, 
Foxhol  and Honig of Zaandam  in the middle of 1965.  It was  a  horizontal merger 
as both national and international interests largely overlapped.  Part of the -8-
merged firm - Chemische Fabriek Servo  - was  sold in 1970  to  Chemische Werke 
Hlils  A.G.  of W.  Germany  in order to  concentrate activities upon the  food 
industry.  This  group  is established in other E.E.C.  countries (France, 
w.  Germany,  U.K.,  Belgium,  Italy) as well  as Switzerland,  the u.s.,  Sweden 
and s.  Africa.  Of the 5048  employees  (1972),  1813  were  employed abroad. 
The  two  main  sectors are: 
a)  The  farina or starch division,  with derivatives and natural and synthetic 
polymers,  glucose and dextrose,  animal  feedstuffs  and,  since 1973,  flour 
milling.  This  division has farina plants in the Netherlands,  Belgium and W. 
Germany.  5o%  of the division's sales are exported. 
b)  The  branded articles division comprising soups,  ready meals,  spices, 
fruit  juices and flour products  like macaroni  and vermicelli. 
The  main group  figures  for the past  few  years have  been: 
1967/68  1968/69  1969/70  1970/71  1'971/72  1972/73 
Employees 
In million guilders: 
Sales:  424.8 
in Holland  146.6 
abroad +  exports  278.2 
Gross profits 
Depreciation 
Cash  flow  23.1 
Net  Profits  10.0 
Investments  23.4 
Source:  Annual  reports 
457.7 
150.3 
307.4 
41.4 
20.3 
11.3 
483.7 
153.4 
330.3 
22.3 
25.3 
6. 1 
5036 
485.0 
151.3 
333.7 
38.2 
23.5 
27.8 
8.2 
26.4 
5048 
508.2 
160.0 
348.2 
43.2 
31.0 
11.3 
22.3 
7028 
655.0 
255.3 
399.6 
49.7 
28.0 
35.1 
13.8 
43.1 
The  flour and bakery interests were taken over from  the Dutch Cooperative 
Consumer Organization in 1973  and consisted of 2  flour milling installations 
and the silo  located in the port  of Rotterdam,  some  20  bakeries and a 
number of depots.  Results  in the flour sector have  been positive during the 
past  few  years,  though fluctuations occurred.  This is in accordance with the 
results achieved in the flour milling sectors of Wessanen and Meneba  both of 
which  reported "satisfactory profits".  Losses are however made  by all these 
firms  in the bread bakery sectors and for  each  group  they run into millions 
of guilders.  Sales of the flour milling sector are estimated at  some  Fls 50 
million,  staying at this level throughout  the years apart  from  fluctuations 
due to  raw materials'  prices. -9-
4.  The  Bread Baking Industry 
Between  1960  and  1970  per capita bread consumption  in the Netherlands 
declined regularly from  83.69  kgs to  64.56  (1974:  62.40  kgs). 
Due  to  increasing population the total consumption fell  less steep:  from 
707  million kilograms to  619  million kgs.  Parallel with this decline,  the 
number of independent  bakeries has  decreased sharply.  In 1953  there were 
13.100  bakeries,  in 1958  about  12000  and in 1972  5200.  As  some  350  bakeries 
are being closed each year,  today's total will be  below 4.800. 
There are about  120  large  industrial bakeries,  using a  particular type of 
furnace  (the "gaasmatoven")  which makes  continuous bread product ion possible. 
The  industrial bakery section has  regularly increased its share of total 
sales (expressed  in bales of 50  kgs)  during the sixties and early seventies, 
though the growth has  recently been  stopped. 
Table 4 
Shares  in bread market  sales  (%  of total sales) 
.J..2j§_  1964  1.2.§2.  .12l1  1974k 
Small  firms  78  65  60  54  55 
Industrial firms  22  35  40  46  45 
k  estimate 
Within the  industrial bakery section,  the three firms  described previously 
are vertically integrated from  flour production to  bread baking and distribution. 
The  companies  in this integrated sector had the following  shares  in total bread 
sales: 
Table  5  .J..2j§_  1964  .12l1  .12ll 
Meneba,  Rotterdam  4  6  19  21 
Sleut els,  Lei  den  2  4  taken over by Meneba  in 1965 
CO-OP,  Rotterdam  7  8.5  9  7 
Wessanen,  Wormerveer  2  3 
In addition to these  companies,  a  strong position on the bread market  is also 
held by the united bakeries,  SABA  (which means  Samenwerkende  Bakkersbedrijven), 
a  combination of about  one  hundred privately owned  bread factories,  selling 
their product  according to  agreed standards under the  joint trade mark  of Bums. 
The  structural composition of the bread market  and its main  sellers is therefore 
as  follows: Table  6 
Group  Trade mark  Total bread 
sale  sit 
Meneba  King Corn  320 
SABA  Bums  270 
K.S.H.  Juweel  105 
Wessanen  45 
i~~ million guilders 
- 10-
Market 
share 
21 
18 
7 
3 
~~i 
No,of bread 
factories 
14 
81 
15 
4 
The  total Dutch bread market  is estimated at Fls  1300  to  1400  million per 
year and is receding slowly.  The  number of people  employed in the bakeries 
has  fluctuated around  13000  since the 1950's,  which means,  in view of the 
sharp  decline in the number of bakeries,  that the average  size has greatly 
increased,  There  remain however  large differences between the size classes 
of baking plants,  both in the bread baking sector as  a  whole  and within 
particular firms.  A  1971  survey1)  gave  the division according to types of plants: 
Table  7 
T;l£e  of firm  Scale in flour  Number  of  Avera~e size  Share  in 
bales 12er  week  ]2lant s  in bales 12er  week  bread out12ut 
one-man  company  <  14  1494  11  7% 
other small-scale  14-100  3824  28  45% 
medium  scale  100-300  100  120  5% 
small  factories  300-2000  108  650  28% 
large factories  .>  2000  16  2200  15% 
5542  43  100 
It is customary in the trade to  put  the  lower limit  of medium  sized plants 
at  100  bales per week,  The  upper limit  is given by the presence of an automatic 
furnace  and adjoining machinery.  Firms  like Meneba  have mainly large factories, 
Its largest plant  is located at Rijswijk,  near the Hague,  where  275.000-300,000 
loaves of bread are produced per week.  On  the other hand the average  SABA 
factory achieves an output  of 28,000  loaves and the  former CO-OP  planmfell 
mainly in the  small  factory class,  There are  economies of scale in industrial 
br~ad production.  Figure  1  below gives an indication based on research carried 
out  in 1971  for the one-shift  production  system;  figure  2  repeats the performance 
for the two-shift  production system in industrial plants. 
1)  Rapport  over de  structuur van het  bakkersbedrijf en  de  ontwikkeling van 
de  broodvoorziening,  Productschap  granen,  zaden  en peulvruchten, r 
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Figure  1:  direct  production costs per 
100  loaves for varying scales 
of output  in bread bakeries 
Figure 2:  direct production costs per 
A  100  loaves 
~ 
IS"oo  l,l.occ 
indicates production with non-automatic machinery 
indicates production with one  automatic  furnace plus 
auxiliary machinery 
indicates production with two  automatic  furnaces plus 
auxiliary machinery 
As  will be  seen from the figures,  direct  production costs decline fast  in 
the non-automatic,  one  shift production system between outputs of 20  and  150 
bales per week,  namely  from Fls 29.81  per 100  loaves to Fls 17.87 per 100  loaves. 
With  automated,  one-shift  production  systems the recession in costs is less 
pronounced,  viz.  from  Fls  18.72 to Fls  15.27 as output  increases  from  200  bales 
per week  to  600  bales per week.  Adding a  second automatic  furnace  in the one-
shift production  system makes  no  sense:  the  large  firms use the  double shift - 12-
system.  Here we  see that  costs  reach their lowest  level at  an output  of 
2400  bales per week  (Fls 11.81  per 100  loaves)  with the aid of two  automatic 
furnaces.  If one  furnace  is used in the  double  shift  system  costs  reach their 
lowest  level at  1200  bales per week  (Fls 12.74 per 100  loaves). 
The  general  decline  in production costs with  increasing scale puts a  premium 
on capacity expansion,  so  that  direct  production costs would  seem  to  favour 
large  firms.  But  general overhead costs and distribution costs  should also  be 
taken into account.  General  overhead costs vary from  Fls 3,-- per one  hundred 
loaves with  small  firms  to Fls 6,-- with the  larger firms.  In comparison with 
direct production costs and distribution costs,  the  overhead costs are not 
so  important,  but  they seem  to  favour  smaller companies.  As  to distribution 
costs,  the  smaller companies  have  a  clear advantage,  which varies according 
to the type of distribution.  The  larger the  scale of output,  the more  costs 
for distribution have to  be made  and this hampers the  larger firms.  The  survey 
made  in 1971,  cited earlier,  puts the difference,  with weekly sales of Fls.  3500,--, 
at  8%,  mainly because of transport  costs towards and higher wages  in the retail 
chain stores.  Distribution costs vary according to whether sales take place in 
shops,  or in house to  house  selling,  and whether sales occur in cities,  villages 
or in the  country.  Table 8 gives the comparison for city-sales in shops and 
house to  house  selling for two  types of firms,  both having weekly sales of 
Fls 3500,-. 
Table 8  Cost  prices for bread in city sales (in cents) 
Shop  selling  House  to  house  selling 
Small  firms  Larg:e  firms  Small  firms  LarB:e  firms 
Raw  materials  36.0  35.5  36.0  35.5 
Production costs  24.5  13.5  24.5  13.5 
Overhead  3.0  5.5  3.0  5. 5 
Distribution costs  19.5  29.5  25.0  32.5 
Wastage  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0 
Taxes  ...b..2  ....h2..  ...b..2  ...b..2 
Total  89.5  90.5  95.0  93.5 
Thus,  whereas  large  firms  score on direct  production costs,  small  firms  score 
on distribution costs  (shops  annex to  the bakery)  and the ultimate result 
(the total cost  price)  a  few  years ago  was  about  equal  but  supposedly advantageous 
to  large-scale baking in the  longer run,  as wages,  social  charges and  employee 
scarcity in production were  thought  to rise.  It was  on the basis of this theory - 13-
that the largest  firms tried to  increase their grip on the bread market  via 
mergers and take-overs.  By  closing down  the medium  and  small  scale bakeries 
and rationalising output  they hoped to  cut  their costs and increase capacity 
utilisation. 
Up  to  1971/72  this idea worked,  though the restructuring process  inflicted 
heavy losses on them.  But  in recent  years,  house to house  selling has  declined 
fastly in importance,  as table 9  shows.  In three to four years it is considered 
to  be  a  thing of the past. 
Distribution channels of bread sales (percentages) 
1W 
House  to  house  selling  64 
Supermarkets  8 
Other shops  28 
.!2E. 
46 
25 
29 
30 
24 
In this form  of distribution the industrial firms  were  strongly represented: 
e.g.  in 1970  CO-OP  sold 6o%  of its bread via the  door to  door salesman. 
Wage  inflation and scarcity of labourhave hit primarily the door to  door sales; 
increasing motorisation of housewives,  together with the constantly rising bread 
price has  been another factor.  Lastly,  the  standardized meagre quality of bread 
(in the  eyes of consumers)  from  industrial bakeries has  added to the problems. 
Thus,  today,  a  large overcapacity (estimated at 30-5o%)  hangs over the industrial 
sector and sales to  supermarket  organizations,  mostly at  cut-prices below  cost, 
had to  be  effected to keep the bread lines moving.  Another  escape would be  bread 
exports,  which are growing but  are still too  small to  change the results. 
Meneba  sells about Fls 30  million,  or 8-1o%  of total bread sales abroad. 
Small  bakeries (the "warm  bakers"  with sales of an average  5000  loaves per week) 
have the best  position in this fiercely ranging competitive battle.  Demand  for 
the  luxury types of quality bread is rising fast,  distribution costs are  low, 
the motor car enables people to  shop  amongst  a  large variety of bread types 
freshly served in an attractively decorated small  shop  and is not  spoiled by 
chemicals,  cooling,  reheating,  etc.  At  the  end of 1973,  the  large firms  retaliated 
by announcing a  new  type of bread,  imitating the "warm  bakeries",  with  lower 
fat  contents and no  longer cross-baked (i.e.  a  way  of compact  bread baking 
providing the  loaves with cross-ridges):  information was  lavishly provided on 
the changes taking place.  This  imitation "as the sincerest  form  of flattery'' 
was  a  sheer necessity,  but  whether it will achieve its end - to beat  the 
competition from  the tiny shops  on the corner - without  violating the principles 
of industrial baking remains to be  seen.  Opinion among  the large firms  is - 14-
divided:  there are optimists and pessimists.  They are united,  however,  in 
urging the Ministry of Economic Affairs to  raise the compelled minimum 
consumer price,  which would also bind the "warm  bakers".  In vain,  these 
last ones argue that they have  no  need for higher prices: their profits 
are satisfactory they say,  with  expanding sales.  But  if the  consumer is 
not  going to pay the "restructuring and rationalisation costs" of the mergers 
in the  industrial sector,  who  else could save  employment  and cover the  losses, 
running into millions of the food giants now  dominating the bakery industry? Part  8:  Concentration in the  cocoa processing industry Concentration in the Cocoa,  Chocolate and Confectionary Industry 
1.  Introduction 
The  leading position of this Dutch  industry in the world is based on (1)  the 
processing capacity of cocoa beans and  (2)  its role as a  world exporter of 
various products.  As  to  the first,  the Netherlands  ranks  fourth as an  importer 
of cocoa beans for processing,  after the u.s.  (18%),  W.  Germany  (9%),  the Soviet 
Union  (more  than 8%).  Nearly 8%  of world consumption of cocoa beans were  imported 
by The  Netherlands  in 1972.  Imported beans are being sorted,  broken,  roasted and 
milled.  The  cocoa-mass  acquired afterwards  is being used in two  main processes: 
a)  for the production of cocoa butter and  cocoa powder. 
By  means  of pressing,  the cocoa butter is separated from  the mass  and the remaining 
substance is broken and milled into  powder.  This  cocoa powder is used for mixing 
with various products,  such as milk,  ice and cremes or directly sold for 
consumption. 
b)  the cocoa-mass  can also  be used for making chocolate and confectionary. 
It is then being mixed with  sugar,  cocoa butter,  milk powder and  sweets. 
After mixing,  this mass  is being rolled,  refined with a  view to  consumer tastes 
and finally is given its ultimate form.  The  milling of cocoa beans  is therefore 
undertaken for the purpose of producing three main articles,  viz.  cocoa-butter, 
cocoa-powder and chocolatery.  Table  1  gives this division and the growth of 
output  since  1950,  as well as the number of firms. 
Table  1  The  development  of the Dutch  cocoa-beans processing industry: 
1950  - 1971 
1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1971 
Number  of firms  46  44  42  35  27  27 
Output  of cocoa-butter (1)(2)  12.6  19.2  34.2  42.7  48.5  55.8 
Output  of cocoa  powder (1)(2)  18.2  22.4  34.6  37.1  46.9  47.9 
Output  of chocolate  (1)(3)  47.8  29.9  49.5  62.7  53.3  46.4 
and related articles 
Same,  incl.  output  of 
candy bars  115.4  117.0 
(1)  In million kilograms 
(2)  Amounts  not  further processed in the  cocoa processing industry into 
chocolate articles and  coverings during the year.  Total output  of 
cocoa butter and powder is not  known 
(3)  In the  sense of the Dutch Commodities  Law,  i.e.  not  counting imitation 
chocolate and articles. 
Source:  Composed  from  various C.B.S.  production statistics. -2-
The  second measure which  indicates the importance of the Dutch  cocoa and 
chocolate  industry is the  export  position.  For the three main products,  the 
Netherlands is by far the largest world exporter.  Sales abroad in 1972  were 
195.000  tons of cocoa and chocolate products at  a  value of Fls 574  million. 
2.  Production and Sales 
The  development  of output  of the three main "end-products"  of the  cocoa-
processing industry has been given in table  1.  It has to  be  remarked that 
true output  of cocoa-butter and -powder is larger than it appears  from the 
table,  because the vertically integrated firms which produce  chocolate-
articles also preponderantly make  butter and powder for further processing. 
No  data relating to  these activities are made  available as this structure 
of the industry is a  traditional one.  There is reason to treat the three 
main products as being in separate sector markets.  Tendencies  in each of 
these markets may  be perceived from tables 2,  3 and 4. 
Excluding again the internal deliveries between the vertically integrated 
firms,  it follows  from table 2  that  cocoa butter output  is practically wholly 
exported.  With  37%  of world exports  in 1972,  The  Netherlands are the  leading 
exporter,  while the number  two  is Ghana  (15%).  The  main  customers are W.  Germany 
(about  one-quarter of total exports),  Belgium,  Switzerland and Great  Britain. 
Though  competition from  a  number of less  developed countries increases since 
the sixties,  there is a  regular growth of exports. 
Table 2  DeveloEment  of cocoa butter sales 1220-1211 
(in million kgs) 
1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1971 
Total  sales  16. 1  22.1  36.2  49.5  54.7  60.3 
Internal sales  4.1  3.1  3.4  6.9  5.6  5· 7 
Net  sales (1)  12.4  19.0  32.8  42.6  49.1  54.6 
Foreign sales  12.4  19.0  32.8  42.6  49.1  54.6 
( 1  )  A very small  amount  is sold on the  domestic market  to  firms  other than 
cocoa-processing ones,  such as ointment,  schmink and lipstick producers. 
Table  3  gives sales of cocoa-powder.  Domestic  sales are small and decreasing, 
but  foreign  sales increase slowly.  The  Dutch  industry accounts for about  half 
the world's  exports,  followed by W.  Germany  (12%).  The  main  customer are the 
u.s.  with 40-5o%  of total foreign sales.  About  one-third is traditionally sold 
in other EEC  countries,  of which W.  Germany  is by far the  largest  destination. -3-
Table 3  Development  of cocoa-powder sales,  1950-1971 
(in million kgs) 
1950  1955  1960  1965  1970 
Total net  sales ( 1)  17.2  21.9  31.6  39.6  46.4 
Domestic  sales  s. 5  3.0  4.2  5.3  3.4 
Foreign sales  11.7  18.9  27.4  34.3  43.0 
(1)  After elimination of internal deliveries. 
1971 
44.9 
1. 3 
43;.6 
Finally,  table 4 gives the  division of sales of chocolate,  chocolate articles 
~d  c~~dy bars.  There is a  clear emphasis  on  domestic  sales,  as far as the 
traditional articles are  concerned.  However,  with the rise of sales of candy 
bars  since the  early sixties the picture has  changed considerably. 
Initially this product  was  not  considered part of the chocolate  industry and 
sales were not  comprised in the statistics.  In later years  candy bars,  which 
turned out  to  be  a  growth product,  were  included.  They have appeared to  be a 
substitute for the massive  chocolate bars.  9o%  of output  of all chocolate 
products  (including candy bars) are being sold abroad since 1966.  W.  Germany 
is the main  customer (6o%),  followed by France and Belgium.  In reverse,  EEC 
imports have  gone  up  from  13%  of domestic  consumption  in 1962,  to  more  than 
2o%  in 1972.  The  main  importing countries are Belgium,  W.  Germany  and Italy. 
Table 4  Development  of chocolate sales 1950-1972  (1) 
(in million kgs) 
1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1971 
Total  sales ( 2)  46.2  29.4  49.1  63.3  53. 5( 3) 46. 7  ( 3) 
Domestic  sales  29.3  24.0  38.8  49.7  39. 5(3)36. 5(3) 
Foreign sales  16.9  5-4  10.3  13.6  13.0  10.2 
Total  sales (incl.  of  115.2  118.9 
candy bars) 
Domestic  sales  52.2  so. 7 
Foreign sales  63.0  68.2 
1972 
129.4 
51.9 
77.5 
(1)  The  main articles are bars,  sweets,  tablets,  coverings,  granules and 
flakes 
(2)  After elimination of internal sales 
(3)  Estimates. 
Table 5 gives a  summary  of the percentages of the values  exported for various 
groups  of the Dutch  cocoa-processing industry.  It  shows  the relative importance 
of cocoa-butter and the  increasing weight  of the  export  of candy bars. -4-
Table  5 
1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1971 
cocoa-butter  40.7  54-9  39.8  52.5  48.8  42.4 
cocoa-powder  20.1  29.4  33.3  13.8  15.9  17.2 
chocolate and  37.6  12.5  24.7  32.2(2)  33.4(2)  38.3(2) 
-articles 
other products 
(1)  ____h§_  _ld  ~ 1.2  1.2  2.1 
100  100  100  100  100  100 
( 1)  including cocoa-waste products 
(2)  including candy bars 
3.  Structural Tendencies 
The  long term trend in the  industry is clearly towards a  smaller number of 
companies.  In 1973,  only 20  separate  firms were  left.  Up  to  1966  the number of firms 
and the number of plants was  about  equal,  but  no  information has been supplied 
since then on this aspect.  The  reduction in the number of companies is mainly 
due to mergers.  Most  of these mergers were  effected by large national  companies, 
taking over the profitable smaller ones,  or by diversified multinational 
cmmpanies  taking over the  leading firms  in the cocoa-processing industry. 
Table  6 reviews the leading companies,  their market  shares and their presence 
in sub-markets,  on the basis of the tonnages of cocoa-beans processed. 
Table  6  The  main cocoa-processing companies,  in 1273 
Name  Location  Market  share  Sub-market  Belonging to: 
1.  De  Zaan  Koog-Zaandijk  45  butter & powder  Grace  Cy. 
2.  Wessanen Wormerveer  15  butter,  powder  independent 
& chocolate articles 
3.  Bensdorp  Bus  sum  10  butter,  powder & choc.  Unilever 
4.  Gerkens  Wormer  5-7  butter & powder  Capital Foods 
5.  Korff  Amsterdam  5  butter,  powder & choc.  independent 
6.  Kwatta  Breda  5  butter,  powder & choc.  partly Cont.  Foods 
7.  Verkade  Zaandam  5  butter,  powder & choc.  independent 
It will be  seen that  of the 7 main firms,  accounting for over 90  percent  of 
market  sales,  only two  firms  (Korff and Verkade)  are  independent  from  the 
multinationals.  Wessanen is an  internationally spread and diversified food -5-
producer,  occupying a  prominent  position also  in flour milling,  cattle foods, 
meat  processing.  The  list of mergers  since 1962  can best  be  seen in conjunction 
with the position of the companies  in sub-markets,  in order to  determine the 
strategical moves  of the  companies.  Already before  1962  the u.s.  conglomerate 
firm of W.R.  Grace Cy.  has taken over De  Zaan,  the  dominant  producer in the 
sub-market  of butter & powder.  Grace,  which  owns  a  chocolate  firm  in the u.s. 
thus  effected a  vertical backward integration.  Another backward integration 
was  carried out  by Capital Foods  in 1969  when  it took over the firm of Gerkins. 
Thus  the two  large Dutch producers,  devoting themselves  exclusively to butter 
and powder production have  gone  over into American hands. 
The  other five  suppliers operate on the three main  sub-markets,  though they 
have  different  market  positions.  The  Bensdorp takeover of Blooker in 1962 
strengthened appreciably its position on the U.S.  market.  In the massive 
chocolate bar market  in The  Netherlands,  Bensdorp  likewise has made  progress 
since:  its market  share with the Bros-bar is  1o%.  In 1973  this profitable 
company  was  taken over by Unilever.  Wessanen,  on the other hand,  is withdrawing 
from the chocolate  consumer market  and now  applies itself to  intermediate 
products.  Also,  it is diversifying into other food  sectors.  Another firm, 
Kwatta,  has made  losses since  1966,  and is diversifying too,  but will,  according 
to  insiders in the trade,  soon  loose its independence.  Already,  Continental 
Foods  from  Belgium has acquired a  33%  participation,  while,  in reverse,  Kwatta 
owns  7~ of C.F. 's stock. 
All the  large  firms  in the trade,  with the  exception of Korff and Verkade were 
involved in the ongoing merger activity of the past ten years.  Some  characteristics 
of this merger wave  were: 
- the  large firms  have  bought  smaller and profitable companies  in their own 
sub-markets.  The  goal has  been to acquire  reputed marks  such as Van  Houten, 
Blooker and Ringers.  A clear example  is Van  Houten,  which has been  liquidated 
as an operating firm,  but  whose  trade name  and patents occupy a  prominent 
position in the W.  German  Manheim-group. 
- another tendency is the diversification towards other sub-markets,  again with 
the  goal to acquire prominent  marks. 
-moreover large firms  are being bought  by the multinational  (and mainly u.s.) 
firms.  From  the list of mergers this tendency comes  forward most  forcibly. 
4.  Distribution and Marketing 
The  receding sub-market  of chocolate and -articles can be  divided into three 
product  markets. First,  there is the chocolate granules and flakes market, 
with only three suppliers,  viz.  Venz  (belonging to Van  Nelle of Rotterdam), 
Delicia  (Wessanen)  and  De  Ruyter.  There  is however a  growing supply of imitation -6-
chocolate litter,  of which there are two  sellers,  Croklaan (Unilever) 
and Boon. 
Second,  the more  expense  chocolate articles'  product  market  is stagnating. 
The  main  suppliers of quality products are Verkade,  Droste,  Kwatta  and 
Union,  which have  strong competition from  two  Belgian firms:  Cote  d'Gr and 
Meurisse and the Italian company of Ferrero  (with  sweets  sold under the mark 
name  of Mon  Cheri). 
Third,  the most  important  product  market  is composed of chocolate bars and 
tablets.  Nearly all firms  sell in this market.  This product-market  is 
interesting because of the rise of the  candy bar and because of the position 
of the  large  scale trading sector. 
The  candy bar is not  considered as belonging to the chocolate  sector in the 
technical or traditional  sense.  However,  economically,  the candy bar is 
clearly a  substitute product  for other  chocolate bars  (and  ma~be for other 
sweets as well).  Since  1961,  the u.s.  firm of Mars  has  produced these bars 
in its own  factory in The  Netherlands;  by means  of a.o.  large-scale advertising 
campaigns the firm has  succeeded in capturing the  domestic as well as the 
E.E.C.  market  (most  of the  sales given in table 4 are  effected in other E.E.C. 
countries).  The  present-day market  share of Mars  (measured in terms of output) 
is estimated between  60  to  7o%.  The  Mars'  market  share may  well  be higher. 
Before  1962,  Nuts  produced the  candy bars under  licence  from Mars,  U.K.,  a 
subsidiary of Mars u.s.A.  After the  licence  elapsed,  because of Mars'  own 
production in the Netherlands  some  coordination remained.  No  fierce price 
competition was  waged between these firms,  as was  indeed the  case when Van 
Houten achieved a  1o%  market  share with a  bar of its own  during the  second 
half of the sixties. 
The  Dutch  firm of Nuts  is second with a  share of  some  2o%.  In the formal  sense 
this constitutes a  duopoly,  but,  in fact,  there is more  reason to think in 
terms of a  monopolistic market  structure,  because there are indications for 
the existence of mutual "listening posts". 
Mars  has  succeeded in capturing the  candy bar market  because of its consistent 
banking on the fact  that the chocolate bar is an  impulsively bought  product. 
Intensive,  general  distribution (there are about  60,000  points of sale!)  coupled 
with a  thoroughly made  up presentation and penetrating advertising have  done 
the trick.  The  reactions of established chocolate bar producers have  been 
"too little and too  late". 
The  second feature of the  chocolate bars and tablets market  is the  dominating 
position of the retail chains.  Jamin,  A.  Heyn  and De  Gruyter (a subsidiary of 
the  Dutch  conglomerate  SHV)  are vertically integrated,  giving them  a  strong -7-
position in marketing as well as purchasing.  The  retail combinations with 
central purchasing,  such as Spar and Vege  have  concluded  long term contracts 
with  chocolate factories (in the Spar and Vege  case with Korff)  for the 
purchase of fixed and massive,  guaranteed quantities of these products at  low 
prices.  From table 7,  a  comparison of prices quoted by producers and retailers 
of chocolate  characters of substantially the  same  quality,  it follows that the 
firms  selling under their own  or acquired marks have  prices which are 35  to 
11o%  above those of the integrated producers or retail chains.  Moreover,  such 
differences  existed already since  1965,  the year when  such a  survey was  made 
for the first  time.  Since then,  the branded characters'  prices have  risen 4o%, 
the other ones  on average  some  12%. 
It is also note worthy that the  chocolate characters for diabetes,  containing 
no  sugar,  cost  about  twice as much  as the normal  ones.  No  explanation could be 
given by industry spokesmen  justifying such a  difference in price,  so  that there 
is a  presumption that the inelastic demand  is being exploited. 
Also,  the largest price increases between  1971  and  1973  were achieved by the 
firms with  famous  mark  names.  They clearly derive market  power and profits from 
such marks,  which underlines the attractiveness of the acquisition of well-classed 
companies. 
Moreover,  the countervailing power of the purchase  combinations and retail chains, 
where  mass  merchandising counts,  seems  to  be  rather strong and to  give worthwhile 
results. 
Acknowledgements: 
This  report  is based on the annual  reports of the Dutch  cocoa  and  cocoa products 
association and discussions with the association's  economist  Drs.  Th.  van der 
Waarden;  on a  study of the branch made  by the National  Investment  Bank;  on  CBS 
production statistics and on a  contributory survey by Drs.  F.  van Winden. 1962: 
1962: 
1963: 
1963: 
1964: 
1966: 
1969: 
1969: 
1969: 
1970: 
1970: 
1971: 
1971: 
1972: 
1972: 
1973: 
1973: 
1973: 
List o£  Mergers  and  Take-overs  1962-1973 
Bensdorp  takes control o£  Blocker  (Bussum) 
Wessanen  acquires Nicolet  (Krommenie) 
Wessanen  acquires Delicia (Tilburg) 
Grace  Cy.  (American conglomerate)  acquires Van  Houten 
(soon afterwards  the u.s.  firm Peter Paul  acquired 49%  of 
the shares) 
De  Zaan  acquires  Raak  (snacks  and drinks;  Utrecht) 
General Biscuits  (Belgium)  acquires Victoria 
Cavenham  Foods  (England)  acquires  Ringers 
Capital Foods  Industries  (America)  takes  a  majority share 
in Gerkens  Cocoa Industry 
Xwatta  acquires Van  Dungen  and  Rademaker  (subsidiary company 
o£  Van  Dungen).  Also,  Driessen gets under  the control ot Kwatta. 
Kwatta acquires Wijnand Beke  (marchepane  and £ruitcakesJ 
The  Hague) 
Droste acquires  Ringers  £rom  Cavenham  Foods 
Droste acquires  Rademaker's  Kon.  Cocoa and Chocolate Factories 
Van  Houten  gets into  the hands  o£  the w.  German  Monheim  group. 
Especially involved are the  trade mark  and patents. 
Xwatta and Continental Foods  (Belgium)  cooperate by means  o£  share 
participation. 
The  centre o£  gravity lies with Continental  Foods. 
Wessanen  acquires Bakery Winkel  and  De  Graaf's Bakeries 
Wessanen  takes control o£  the Lijemp£  (ice and milk products; 
Leeuwarden),  De  Nibecom  (slaughteries;  Rotterdam),  de  Nieuwe 
Vlees Compagnie  (meattrade;  Rotterdam)  and the !lour-mill  ·~eert" 
Unilever acquires Bensdorp  (Bussum) 
Van  Nelle acquires Venz  (especially bread litter; Vaassen). Table  7  Average  price o£  chocolate characters  per 100  grams  in Dutch  cents 
Producer:  1971  1972  1973 
Baronie  134  140  149 
Droste  161  157  164 
VanHouten  142  146  139 
Union  150  149  167 
Verkade  150  150  164 
Producer  and 
retail chain: 
Albert Heijn  98  98  98 
De  Gruyter  84  84  79 
Jam in  94  94  100 
Co-op  88  88  113 
Retail chain or 
purchasing combination 
Edah  100  73  -
Hema  88  87  97 
Simon  de  Wit  86  86  94 
Spar  84  89  95 
Vroom  en Dreesman  89  95  103 